air and constantly threatened by paratroop drops, the Japanese learned to establish a distributed defense that could react to US amphibious landings with a small force early, then rapidly reinforce with an armored reserve.8 By the battle of San Manuel on Luzon, the Japanese esta- blished a formidable defense enabled by a combined infantry-armor approach, with tanks supporting the infantry antitank force. US armor rushed the Japanese defenders in a cavalry charge, but the intended shock effect was quickly thwarted by intense anti-armor volleys from the integrated defense.9 The initial US armored assault failed. In a second attempt, US forces better coordinated a two-battalion attack with close coordination between artillery, infantry, and armor. The amended combined arms approach quickly overran the Japanese defenders.


US armored forces adapted more rapidly to the challenges of the theater. After in- itially suffering devastating tank losses in the Philippines, the US Army and Marines learned from failure and gradually increased infantry-armor cooperation. The Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa landings all pri- oritized getting US armor to the beach- head early to support the infantry assaults.11 At Peleliu, the Marine Corps’ employed their tanks in an infantry-support role, providing firepower and protection as the infantry established the beachhead and pushed inland.12 The Army took a different approach, preferring to keep valuable tanks in reserve to exploit as a consolidated armored force, as they did when the 1st Cavalry “Flying Column” rushed to Cabanatuan on Luzon.13 Over time, both forces developed increasing sophistication in combined arms inte- gration. The Marine Corps developed and fielded amphibious armored platforms like the Buffalo LVT to penetrate beach- heads alongside the infantry, while the Army began to integrate tanks, air support, and infantry in concert, as when it suc- cessfully broke the formidable Shimbu Line north of Manila.14


Over time, the US Army and Marines both learned to integrate the strengths of well- equipped infantry in complex terrain with the mobility, firepower, and protection of armor to penetrate and exploit through enemy defenses.The Marines developed armor specifically tailored for the theater


8


Disabled Japanese Light Tank in San Manuel, 1945.10


and both services continued to adapt ex- isting tactics and techniques to create synergistic effects between infantry, fires, and armor. By Okinawa, the final amphi- bious assault of the theater, US Marines had successfully integrated LVTs, M4 Shermans, infantry, naval fires, and air support in a fully combined arms approach to rapidly seize a beachhead and break out to subsequent Japanese defenses.15 MG Shepherd, 6th Marine Division Com- mander, said of armor at Okinawa: “If any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than any other the progress of the campaign, the tank would certainly have to be selected.”16


Conceptions of Future Armored Warfare


The terrain of the Pacific remains largely as it was in 1945, but the interaction of forces and terrain has changed dramati- cally. Armored forces are no longer limited to line-of-sight reconnaissance, limited communications, or purely infantry-sup- port roles. The tyranny of distance and terrain will continue to canalize armor and challenge sustainability, but modern communications and global positioning technology now enables tank formations to cover a wider area more efficiently and mutually support other forces. During the Pacific Campaign, armored forces were often piecemealed into platoon or section elements to support infantry ele- ments as large as a battalion. This infantry -support role often isolated tank crews


from sustainment, armored expertise, and emerging lessons from other armored forces in the theater.17 Today, armored units can expect similar task organiza- tions, but communication with higher echelons and other armored formations will improve sustainment, lesson dissemi- nation, and armored employment as part of a combined-arms team. Enemy surveil- lance and fires technology preclude massed armor formations, but US communications and positioning technology will also enable armor to widely disperse then rapidly mass and re-task organize for penetration, ex- ploitation, or pursuit missions as the sit- uation requires.18 Refining this concept through training can rapidly increase the tempo of operations against an adversary operating in similar maritime terrain.


Enemy concepts of armor in the Pacific are another major change in the contem- porary context. Japanese developed much of their armored doctrine based on experiences in continental Asia, but China has developed a force specifically designed for the Pacific Theater. While the United States relies on the M1A2 Abrams as its sole Main Battle Tank (MBT), the PLA has developed a diverse light tank capability with platforms like the Type 15, Type 63, and ZLT-05.19 In tandem, the PLA has developed a robust doctrine that incorporates armor at echelon through light, medium, and heavy brigades eche- loned by frontline and depth command groups supported by firepower strike


CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024


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