2024 Starry Writing Competition Second Place Essay
Multirole Tanks in Multidomain Operations Emerging Concepts of Armor in the Pacific
MAJ Chris Jarrett
Although not the first image that springs to mind, US armor featured prominently in the 1942-1945 Pacific Campaign of World War II. Although US tanks fought tena- ciously in the defense of the Philippines, American armor seemed particularly un- suited to fighting in a maritime environ- ment.1 By August 1942, Japan’s furthest reach covered thousands of islands and stretched nearly 3,000 miles. This all but granted the Japanese a coup de main with formidable defensive positions. The Allies’ three-year campaign reversed those gains only through the critical integration of armored forces. Of all 70 separate Army tank battalions formed during the war, one-third fought in the Pacific Theater, as did all six Marine tank battalions.2 Despite this historical precedent, the 2022 FM 3-0 Operations does not mention roles or con- siderations for armor anywhere in its chapter dedicated to maritime environ- ments. Fortunately, the 1942-1945 Allied Pacific campaign provides rich insight into roles for armor in the Pacific. This campaign highlights the challenges of terrain and physical space, illustrates the importance of doctrinal and conceptual adaptation, and offers important lessons for armored warfare and Multidomain Operations in the Pacific in the twenty- first century.
Terrain and Space
The eminently inhospitable terrain of the Pacific poses the greatest challenge to armored forces. Soft sand, heavy rains, dense vegetation, and unforgiving slopes coalesce to severely restrict movement on even the largest land masses through- out the theater.3 Most US landing craft require a certain composition and slope of shoreline, and these crafts can only service about 15% of shoreline through the Pacific theater.4 These two variables, the land-based maneuver corridors and serviceable beaches, betray the obvious avenues of approach that armored forces
Fall 2024 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL
can conceivably take. Defenders can easily integrate obstacles, array anti-tank cap- abilities, and preplan integrated fires be- fore armored forces even arrive. Options for maneuver are limited. Furthermore, the distance to sustain a force in such ter- rain is dramatically increased and easily interdicted. Forces must move from island to island rather than utilizing the advan- tages of such terrain for concealment and protection.
This is exactly what happened when the Japanese experienced their first land de- feat at Milne Bay in August, 1942. Though harried by Australian Kittyhawks, the Japanese force employed a single Type 95 Ha-go light tank section to great effect against the Australians defending their airfield in canalized terrain. Despite their air assets, the lightly equipped defenders were pushed back repeatedly by the integrated armor-infantry assaults. By dawn of the 28th, the Japanese were ap- proaching the airfield when the tanks’ engines failed, overcome by the constant strain of the soft soil. Both tanks became irretrievably stuck. With no other choice, the Japanese abandoned their armor,
attacked with infantry alone, and suffered defeat. They were helpless without armor, but their armor was handicapped by the terrain.
Adapting Operational Concepts Because of these terrain difficulties, the Japanese amended their conceptions of armored warfare over the course of the campaign. Prior to the war, the Japanese developed a robust doctrine and organ- ization for division massed armor opera- tions, largely informed by their bitter loss to Russian armor in the Battle of Khalkin Gol. These concepts were not challenged by inferior Chinese armor in the Sino- Japanese war, and therefore Japanese tactics were crafted around the idea of a “mobile mass” of tanks that would strike at a decisive place and time.6 The terrain of the Pacific afforded no room for this approach. As the Japanese suffered their first losses and were pushed back on the defensive, employing armor devolved to piecemeal counterattacks and use of ar- mored platforms as defensive pillboxes.7
The Japanese adapted as they attempted to defend their gains. Harassed by Allied
Disabled Type 95 Ha-go Tanks at the Battle of Milne Bay 5 7
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