Janus, the Roman God, on Armor’s Past and Future Use in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility
MAJ Shameek De Lancey
The ultimate determinate in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins. There are those who would dispute this as an absolute, but it is my belief that while other means may critically influence war today, after whatever devastation and destruction may be inflicted on an enemy, if the strate- gist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is the soldier.
Joseph C. Wylie, Military Strategy Introduction
Janus, the Roman god of doorways and beginnings, is depicted with two faces looking in opposite directions to symbo- lize his ability to look to the past and the future. Like Janus. This article looks at the historical use of armor in the INDO- PACOM AOR to project how armor may be used in future military conflicts in the same region. The US Army has a rich and underappreciated history in the Indo- Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) dating back to the US acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898, following the United States’ victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War.1 Historian, Brian Linn aptly described the US Army’s history in the INDOPACOM AOR from 1898 to World War II (WWII) with his book titled, Guardians of Empire.2 In it Linn chronicled the transition of the US Army from a constabulary peacetime army to the world’s most powerful mili- tary in World War II.3 Less known than the US Army’s involvement in the INDO- PACOM AOR is the use of armor and mounted forces during military operations in the region. This article addresses armor’s rich history and contributions during mul- tiple military operations in the INDOPA- COM AOR.
The article is divided into two sections. First, like the Roman god, Janus, it looks to the past to highlight various historical uses of armor in the INDOPACOM AOR.
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Figure 1. Janus, the Roman God of Doorways and Beginnings. Natasha Sheldon, “The Agonalia Ianuarias: Appeasing Janus, The God of the New Year,” History and Archaeology Online, December 31, 2018, https://historyan-
darchaeologyonline.com/the-agonalia- ianuarias-appeasing-janus-the-god-of- the-new-year/
The first section features short vignettes of armor’s use in WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. These historical analyses are not meant to provide a full representation of these conflicts or com- prehensive examination of armor in them. Instead, this section is meant to repre- sent select features of armor’s use during multiple military operations in the INDO- PACOM AOR and highlight emerging pat- terns across these conflicts, while remaining true to the eminent historian John Lewis Gaddis’ idea of historical consciousness.4
The historical understanding gained from how armor was used in earlier military conflicts within the INDOPACOM AOR informs Janus to then look forward to the future in the second section of the article. The second section builds upon the first and uses two concepts from Foresight Infused Strategy (types of futures and strategic cones) to project how armor may be used in multiple alter- native futures within the INDOPACOM AOR.5
WWII: Defense of Luzon The first US tank engagement in WWII was fought on the Philippine Island of Luzon on 22 December 1941. Elements of the US 192nd Tank Battalion met a Japan-
ese force consisting of infantry, tanks, and antitank gun units.6 The 192nd was ordered to move from the Manila area to northern Luzon to repel the Japanese invasion force at the coastline. It quickly became clear to US and Philippine forces they could not prevent the Japanese from landing and securing a lodgment on Luzon. As a result, General Douglas MacArthur ordered War Plan Orange-3 (WPO-3) into effect.7 WPO-3 was the Philippine Depart- ment’s established war plan that called for all US forces on Luzon to withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula if an overwhelm- ing Japanese invasion. Once on Bataan, the combined US and Philippine forces defended their position to prevent the Japanese from using the port in Manila Bay. Forces on Bataan defended their position until the US Navy reinforced them.8
The 192nd Tank Battalion and its sister battalion, the 194th, formed the Provi- sional Tank Group and arrived on Luzon in late November 1941.9 Colonel James Weaver commanded the Provisional Tank Group which consisted of 108 M-3 Stuart tanks, evenly split between both the 192nd and 194th tank battalions.10 During the delaying action, the Provi- sional Tank Group supported the North Luzon Force by operating as platoon, section, and sometimes individual tanks to slow Japan’s double envelopment advance toward Manila and the Bataan Peninsula.11 The M-3’s mobility, firepower, and protection were more effective than the US horse-mounted 26th Cavalry, which was vulnerable to Japanese armor throughout the entirety of the delaying action.12
The US M-3 tanks were the ideal weapon system to support mounted and dis- mounted infantry as they conducted a series of defensive actions along Manila’s main avenues of approach to Manila and Bataan.13 Additionally, the M-3 tanks were critical in suppressing Japanese forces that allowed US engineers to destroy roads and bridges while the US forces with- drew south toward Bataan. The decision to commit tanks as the detachment left
CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024
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