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USASC Ghillie Durability and Weathering Exercise. (Photo by John A. Sisk II)


Reimagining Snipers in the ABCT – SBCT


SSG John A. Sisk II Introduction


When we hear the term “sniper,” most of us envision a lone figure, hidden in the brush, painstakingly stalking a high-value target, often accompanied by a spotter. This traditional image has been romanti- cized through stories, movies, and historical accounts. However, in modern warfare, this depiction is far from the truth. Snipers are no longer just lone wolves operating behind enemy lines; they are integral parts of a larger, more complex battlefield where agility, speed, and adaptability are crucial for mission success.


The evolution of warfare, especially in large-scale combat operations (LSCO), has necessitated a reevaluation of the role and organization of sniper units, par- ticularly within Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and Armored Brigade Com- bat Teams (ABCT). These units face unique challenges that make traditional sniper operations less feasible, prompting the need for a reimagined approach to sniper task organization.


This proposal seeks to address the current limitations in sniper operations within SBCTs and ABCTs by examining the prob- lem, exploring potential solutions, and offering a new organizational framework designed to enhance the effectiveness of snipers on the modern battlefield.


Fall 2024 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL


The Challenges Facing Snipers in SBCTs and ABCTs


Restricted Mobility


The primary challenge facing snipers in SBCTs and ABCTs is restricted mobility. Current organizational structures, as out- lined in the FY21 and FY22 Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), provide sniper sections with only a single M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Cargo variant and a trailer to move a team of ten snipers on the battlefield. This arrangement severely limits their ability to keep pace with the fast-moving operations typical of LSCO, where battalions and brigades may need to displace rapidly over large distances.


The problem is further exacerbated by the replacement of the M998 with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) A1 Utility variant, which offers less flexibility for transporting snipers. Unlike the M998, the JLTV does not have sufficient seating or cargo space to accommodate a full sniper team and their equipment. This leaves sniper sections reliant on other units for transportation, reducing their operational independence and agility.


Capability and Endurance In addition to mobility, the capability and endurance of sniper teams are also com- promised in the current structure. Snipers in SBCTs and ABCTs are predominantly


dismounted elements, which limits their ability to influence operations unless the unit is in a defensive posture. The lack of dedicated transport and support assets restricts their operational reach and effectiveness, particularly in offensive operations where rapid repositioning is often necessary.


Current doctrine advises that sniper teams begin movement 24 to 72 hours before an operation. However, in a rapidly evolving battlefield, where battalions and brigades may need to change direction or objectives within hours, this approach becomes im- practical. Snipers may find themselves out of position or unable to keep up with the pace of operations, diminishing their ability to contribute to the commander’s intent.


Exploring Solutions: Lessons from the Field


Motorization and Integration with Scout Platoons


Several units have successfully navigated these challenges by motorizing their sniper sections and integrating them with scout platoons. This approach has been tested in both National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations, yielding positive results.


For instance, the 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry Regiment, 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Task Force Dark Rifles) employed a novel method during their


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