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the potential to do so in large-scale com- bat operations (LSCO) today. Armor and mechanized forces are well suited to conduct offensive missions in support of forcible entries and defensive missions to retain and control the terrain seized. At Luzon, the mounted “flying columns” of the 1st CAV cleared major routes and then attacked to seize key terrain deep in Manila, enabling the simultaneous encircle- ment of the city. On Okinawa tanks led the amphibious forcible entry, provided effective fires and feints to enable infantry seizure of restricted terrain, and pene- trated the Shuri line. In Vietnam, cordon and search operations allowed mounted forces to control large operational areas, and their area and mobile defenses secured them. While the equipment and potential threats change constantly, these mission types, frameworks, and the Indo-Pacific operational environment do not. However, in preparing to meet the changing vari- ables, adjusting our mindset to asymmetri- cally solve problems with mounted forces will drive success, as it did historically.


Considering modern threats in the Indo- Pacific, and the constant change in both technological growth and multi-domain defense development, the way we task- organize and the roles we assign to our mounted forces need to facilitate flexi- bility, creativity, and asymmetry. Except for the fight between the 716th and 7th tank battalions, tanks were employed asymmetrically against every problem encountered by Soldiers and Marines from the Philippines to Okinawa. Using tanks as mobile pillboxes, impromptu artillery, breaching vehicles, anti-per- sonnel systems, and bunker-busters created an asymmetric advantage that shaped the close-fight tactics through- out the campaign. Accomplishing these roles requires the early commitment of armor from the onset of the forcible entry, rather than after the expansion of the lodgment. The immense protection, traf- ficability, and tactical employment options generated from multiple weapon systems and munition types provide unlimited po- tential to creatively solve complex problems on behalf of any land component.


How our predecessors task-organized in previous Indo-Pacific campaigns en- abled the roles, missions, and effective- ness of their mounted forces. Accordingly,


26


future operations must provide options to brigade and division commanders, specifically in light or Stryker organiza- tions, by routinely receiving task-orga- nized armor. In the Pacific, the U.S. model during WWII employed “Armored Group Headquarters” which organized under corps or armies and managed the admin- istration of several tank battalions.33 The battalions themselves task-organized to divisions and often dedicated one comp- any for dissection to infantry battalions to create hyper-responsive tank-infantry teams. The remaining companies either formed similar tank-infantry teams or remained under the battalion for aggres- sive mounted maneuvers.34 The integra- tion of the M10 Booker in the 82nd Airborne Division begins to address this capability gap and provides a current model for replication in other infantry and Stryker divisions.


Given the referenced historical examples, potential threats in the Indo-Pacific, and the operational considerations outlined in FM 3-0, chapter 7, the commitment of mounted forces early, asymmetrically, and in flexible task-organization will max- imize the overwhelming lethality of the U.S. armored force in LSCO. Shifting our mental understanding of when armor de- ploys during the force flow into theater, what terrain it operates in, and which threats it defeats, as done in Luzon, Oki- nawa, and Vietnam, will afford command- ers significant options to solve problems and preserve combat power in the Indo -Pacific. Armor in the Indo-Pacific main- tains a long tradition of victory and em- ploying it within similar parameters, or in a similar mindset, will extend this tra- dition well into the future of LSCO.


MAJ Stephen Cumby is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has served most recently as an NTC Rotational Planner, NTC Tank Company OC/T, HHC 1-5 CAV Commander, and a 1-5 CAV Tank Company Commander. He holds a B.S. from Hardin-Simmons University in History. He is a graduate of the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course and Officer Candidate School.


Notes 1 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3


Commissioned Officer Professional De- velopment and Career Management. Washington D.C: Headquarters, Depart- ment of the Army, February 2010. 66


2 Department of the Army. FM 3-0 Operations. Washington, D.C.: Head- quarters, Department of the Army, October 2022. 7-1 to 7-12


3 Metz, Steven, and Douglas V. Johnson II. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. Carlisle, PA: Director, Stra- tegic Studies Institute, U S Army War College, January 2001. 1-7


4 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. About USINDOPACOM. March 2024. https:// www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPA COM/.


5 Starry, Donn A. Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Washington, DC: Depart- ment of the Army, 1978. 9, 90-93


6 Department of the Army, FM 3-0. 6-48


7 Huber, Thomas M. Block by Block: The Challenge of Urban Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and Gen- eral Staff College Press, 2003. 91


8 Sixth United States Army. Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945 - 30 June 1945. WWII Operational Docu- ments, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skel- ton Combined Arms Research Library, January 1982. 1


9 754 Tank Battalion. Battle of Luzon: 754th Tank Battalion: 9 Jan - 30 June ‘45. WWII Operational Documents, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, February 1945. 86-94


10 XIV Corps. Japanese Defense of Cities. WWII Operational Document, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, July 1945. 23-26


11 716 Tank Battalion. After Action Report, 716th Tank Battalion: 9 January 1945 thru 8 February 1945. WWII Opera- tional Documents, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Combined Arms Re- search Library, March 1945. 66-68


12 Huber, Block by Block. 110-114 13 Ibid. 97-100


CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024


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