soldiers and civilians stationed through- out the INDOPACOM AOR. These person- nel reside in at-risk locations like Guam, American Samoa, Saipan, Japan, South Korea, Hawai’i, Australia, India, Indone- sia, the Philippines, and Thailand.33 FM 3-0, Operations, highlights the impor- tance of protecting forward-stationed forces to increase their ability to deter, increase their survivability , and enable them to assist in subsequent joint forcible entry (JFE) operations.34 Despite chal- lenges the INDOPACOM AOR present to armor, the tank and its various models and capabilities played a critical role in enabling the protection of forward sta- tioned forces and conducting operations.
The second insight was the requirement for armor support during urban oper- ations. Armor, in a supporting role to in- fantry, was critical during urban operations in multiple conflicts in the INDOPACOM AOR. Examples include the 1945 Battle of Manila during WWII, the Battle of Seoul in 1950 during the Korean War, and during the 1968 Battle of Hue City during the Vietnam War. In all these conflicts, tanks provided critical firepower, mobility, and protection for US forces conducting urban operations.
The tank proved instrumental against conventional and irregular threats. Enemy armor, anti-tank (AT) capabilities, and the impacts of complex urban terrain required
tactical and operational adaptation but did not completely minimize the use of armor in the region. In “Urbanization and Megacities: Implications for the U.S. Army,” Jeremiah Rozman stated, “MDO in mega- cities is critical to the joint force’s ability to defend U.S. interests and to achieve dominance against any threat, at any time,” and the tank proved to be one of the most effective land-domain weapon systems US forces could employ.35
The third insight is the clear requirement for tanks and armored vehicles in the INDOPACOM AOR despite terrain and weather limitations inherent in conduct- ing military operations in the region. This insight may appear overly simple or obvi- ous but is also the easiest insight to over- look because it addresses the military professional’s primary socialization, para- digms, and mental models about the character of warfare in the INDOPACOM AOR. The historical record suggests that the US Army and armor played a signifi- cant role during military conflicts in the INDOPACOM AOR.
FM 3-0, Operations, 2022, added a chapter on maritime operations to revitalize in doctrine how the US Army can contrib- ute to a primarily maritime theater. The US Army will serve in a supporting role to the US Navy and US Air Force initially during future conflict in the INDOPACOM AOR. However, the historical use of land-
power and armor in the INDOPACOM AOR should not be dismissed. Armor’s past roles in the AOR epitomize what Joseph C. Wylie meant when he said the “man on the scene with a gun,” is the ultimate form of military control and armor has proved to be one of the biggest and most efficient guns. The challenge is to rewire our paradigms and mental models to accept the fact that armor has been and will continue to be employed in the INDOPACOM AOR. It just will look differ- ent. The ideal vision of maneuver warfare and large operational maneuvers, reminis- cent of European battlefields, does not work for most of the INDOPACOM AOR. Instead, tanks task organized individually as sections or platoons to assist dismount- ed infantry in jungles or in complex urban terrain was prevalent throughout all these historical vignettes.
These vignettes are not meant to encap- sulate armor’s entire history in the Pacific but are chosen to illuminate armor’s rich and underappreciated history in the INDO- PACOM AOR. The intent is to highlight the unique characteristics and conditions military leaders should be aware of to consider how tanks were historically used in the region. These insights include armor’s importance during defensive operations, armor’s importance during urban operations, and the requirement to reframe thinking about armor’s use in the AOR despite terrain and weather limita- tions. Having gazed into the past, Janus is ready to turn his attention to the future use of armor in multi-domain operations (MDO) in the INDOPACOM AOR.
Looking Forward
Everyone is talking about tanks. . . Other observers–budget analyst, antimilitarists, skeptics–for a variety of reasons, view the tank as an anachronism, a system rendered useless by recent advances in numbers and effectiveness of long-range antitank systems. The October War, they say, suggests that tanks can now be replaced by large numbers of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).
Major General Donn Starry, “Tanks Forever”
Figure 2. US Army in INDOPACOM. Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Pacific: America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific (Fort Shafter, HI: US Army Pacific, 2023), 9–10.
46
This section covers Janus looking forward into the future to project potential roles and missions for armor forces in the IND- OPACOM AOR. The section covers three
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