specifically one that may contend with both regular and irregular forces. However, by 1966 both tactical success by mounted forces, during Operation CIRCLE PINES, and studies conducted by armor leaders on behalf of the Army, shattered this notion.27


Defending and controlling terrain, as outlined in FM 3-0, is decisive to the joint force that is forward postured in naval ports, airbases, and island landmasses. Only accomplishable by a land compo- nent, the requirement highlights the mari- time environment’s reliance on key land- masses to retain joint freedom of action.28 When employed during the Vietnam War, U.S. mounted forces proved dominant in both defending and controlling key terrain, supply lines, and adjacent formations.


Tactical success in both small tank-in- fantry teams, and larger mechanized formations, led General William West- moreland to request a mechanized brigade in 1965, and subsequently, the commit- ment of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Rearmed with medium tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) for scouts and infantry, the regiment deployed in September 1966. Initially task organized to support adjacent units with small ech- elons, the regiment didn’t fight en masse until Operation ATLANTA in December.29


Repeated ambushes by Viet Cong on re- supply convoys and supply lines through- out the region by 1966 forced units to provide robust security packages with sustainment elements. Entirely mounted, 11 ACR excelled at the requirement and employed tanks and APCs to accomplish it (see Figure 4). During the afternoon of December 2nd, a Viet Cong brigade-sized formation ambushed a supply convoy at Suoi Cat.30 Secured by two tanks and three APCs, the convoy came under intense fires from remote-detonated mines, small arms, recoilless rifles, and mortars. As the tanks actioned against the ambush, 1/11 ACR responded furiously with near immediate commitment of the squadron, its artillery, and attack aviation. The mobil- ity and responsiveness of the formation enabled a rapid establishment of a hasty defense to decimate waves of Viet Cong with immense firepower. Tank canister rounds, machine guns, and supporting artillery fires cost the Viet Cong hundreds of lives and three battalion commanders


Fall 2024 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL


Figure 4: Tanks and APCs form a defensive perimeter in a tight formation.38


by nightfall. The success of the count- er-ambush tactics at Suoi Cat developed into standard procedure by the end of Operation ATLANTA: the ambushed for- mation employs all firepower to protect the escorted element until clear of the engagement area, then regroups and returns to set a support by fire, which then enables all adjacent units to assault the enemy flanks. This showcases the value of mounted formations in securing and controlling lines of communication, and in their asymmetrical application against large formations of light infantry.31


In addition to the success at Suoi Cat, mounted forces often repelled enormous attacks against key terrain. During Oper- ation JUNCTION CITY, three armored battles occurred that highlight the value of armor’s firepower, shock effect, mobil- ity, and staying power in the defense, specifically in an asymmetric fight. At Prek Klok II the sheer firepower of two mechanized companies defeated two battalions of attacking Viet Cong while defending a nearby airbase, suffering only three casualties while inflicting hundreds. At Ban Bang the mobility and shock effect of tanks facilitated many local counterattacks during the defense and imposed two hundred casualties on


the enemy. At Suoi Tre the 2nd Battalion 34th Armor Regiment maneuvered to re- lieve a nearly overran 2nd Battalion 12th Infantry Regiment, breaking through the dense vegetation they drove over the Viet Cong while simultaneously dismantling the remaining attackers with flechette and high explosive main gun fire. Master Sergeant Andrew Hunter stated “they haven’t made the word to describe what we thought when we saw those tanks ... it was de-vine!”32


During each fight, mounted forces were invaluable in defending key bases and secured a significantly larger area than their dismounted counterparts. Their tra- ditional advantages in mobility, protection, and firepower, gave way to numerous asymmetric ones. Unique use of different main gun munitions to shape enemy ma- neuver, physically breaking through veg- etation or over enemy formations, and causing the enemy to either commit or withdraw early, provided a markedly mechanized advantage worth consider- ing for future employment in the region.


Summary and Recommendations Historically, mounted forces in the Indo- Pacific performed remarkably in missions that enabled the joint fight and maintain


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