Barton Whaley’s work on deception, par- ticularly in his book “Stratagem: Decep- tion and Surprise in War,”2 focuses ex- tensively on the role of deception in achieving surprise in combat. Whaley conducted an in-depth analysis of mili- tary history to understand how surprise could be effectively generated and sus- tained through deception. During Whaley’s time, the term surprise was what we to- day understand as achieving an informa- tion advantage over the adversary that enabled a commander to make a decision inside the adversary’s decision space, thereby achieving a tactical or strategic victory.


Modernizing Whaley’s Insights into Information Advantage TTPs Barton Whaley’s research on the power of surprise in combat offers valuable les- sons that can be translated into modern Information Advantage Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Below are some of Whaley’s key points adapted to today’s multi-domain operational environment:


1. Surprise [IA] as a Force Multiplier through Multi-Domain Non-Kinetic Activities and Non-Lethal Capabilities: Whaley’s analysis underscores that surprise is one of the most effective force multipliers in combat, signifi- cantly increasing the likelihood of victory, even when facing numeri- cally superior forces. In modern oper- ations, maneuver practitioners can achieve a similar advantage by going beyond traditional direct and indirect firepower. Integrating capabilities into operations creates additional dilemmas for the adversary, who is often prepared for conventional tactics. By combining these capabilities with traditional firepower, commanders can overwhelm the enemy with unex- pected and complex challenges, there- by amplifying the effectiveness of their maneuver forces.3


2. Frequency and Impact of Surprise [IA] in Combat: Whaley’s examina- tion of historical military engagements reveals that surprise was a decisive factor in over half of the battles, with about 50% of surprise attacks success- fully achieving their objectives. To replicate this success in contempo- rary operations, maneuver practitioners should identify and leverage NKA/


Fall 2024 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL


Figure 2: This military operational overlay illustrates the synchronization of NKA/ NLE (Non-Kinetic Activities/Non-Lethal Effects) Information Forces with maneuver elements in a multi-domain operation (MDO) scenario. It highlights the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic forces, synchronized over time to achieve operational objectives.


NLE capabilities from the physical, informational, and human dimensions during course of action analysis and war gaming. This approach allows for the visualization and assessment of how these capabilities can support mission objectives, ensuring that they are effectively integrated into the overall plan.4


3. Correlation between Surprise [IA] and Victory: Whaley found a strong correlation between surprise and vic- tory, demonstrating that it can often compensate for numerical or tactical disadvantages. In modern military planning, maneuver practitioners should conduct a Correlation of Forces and Means (CoFMs) analysis during the course of action development. This analysis provides data-driven evidence that synchronizing multi- domain information forces with tradi- tional firepower will likely result in victory. Just as direct and indirect fire systems have CoFMs values, so too do information forces, capabili- ties, and assets within multi-domain operations.5


4. Deception as a Critical Component of Surprise: Whaley categorized var- ious deception techniques–such as feints, ruses, camouflage, and disin- formation–as crucial to achieving surprise. These techniques disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process, leading to delayed reactions and dis- organized defenses. For the modern maneuver practitioner, deception re- mains a powerful force multiplier.


Whether through simple decoys, fake signals, or shifts in operational tempo, effective deception causes the adver- sary to misallocate resources. In a multi-domain operational environ- ment, deception is not just a tactic but a critical component of informa- tion forces that should be strategically employed.6


5. Historical and Contemporary Exam- ples of Surprise: Whaley’s analysis of historical examples, such as the German invasion of France in 1940, illustrates the strategic value of de- ception and surprise.7 Similarly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Febru- ary 2022 provides a 21st-century ex- ample, where the use of “maskirovka” – a form of military deception8 – was evident. Under the guise of the annual “Zapad” exercise, Russian forces moved troops into assault positions, catching Ukrainian defenses off-guard.9 Modern maneuver practitioners can draw lessons from such examples to craft deception plans that achieve operational surprise.


6. Patterns of Success and Failure in Achieving Surprise: Whaley identified that successful surprises typically involved a combination of deception and speed, while failures often stem- med from poorly executed deception or the enemy’s anticipation. In the modern context, NKA/NLE capabili- ties and information forces must be integral to operational planning from the outset, rather than added as an afterthought. At the tactical, oper-


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