in contact (DLIC), combined with the limited mobility corridors, complicated their withdrawal while in contact with attacking Japanese forces.14 The M-3 light tank was critical in the withdrawal of US and Philippine forces after Japan’s successful surprise attack on Luzon. Despite inherent terrain restrictions, effec- tive Japanese armor and anti-tank weapons, and the eventual failure to successfully defend Bataan the Provisional Tank Group was critical in the successful withdrawal of US and Philippine forces from across Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula.
Korea: Delay and Defense of the Pusan Perimeter
On 25 June 1950, the Inmun Gun or North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) conducted a surprise attack across the 38th parallel into South Korea. The NKPA invasion force consisted of seven infantry divisions and the 105th Armored Brigade, had 150 T-34 medium tanks.15 The NKPA achieved sig- nificant military gains pushing the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army south of Seoul and eventually to the Pusan Perimeter, in part due to the lack of tanks and anti-tank weapons in the ROK.16 Additionally, the NKPA effectively employed their T-34 medium tanks to overmatch, Task Force Smith, the battalion-sized blunting force sent by the United States to delay the NKPA’s southern advance through South Korea.
American armor did not arrive on the Korean Peninsula until July 1950, when the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions started to arrive with the organic M-24 light tank company assigned to each division.17 The 24th Division arrived first was tasked to delay the NKPA advance south. 24th Division’s mission would allow the ROK, US, and United Nations forces time to recover, establish a coherent de- fense, and eventually counterattack the NKPA.18 The 24th Division suffered a series of defeats in part due to the mismatch be- tween the NKPA T-34 medium tank against the US M-24 light tank.
An Armor School post-war report pub- lished in 1952 captured this mismatch by stating, “Light tank companies had been thrown into Korea as a stop-gap measure. Hasty arrangements were being made in Japan and the United States to provide medium tank support as soon as possi- ble.”19 Medium US tanks reached South
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Korea in August 1950, when M-26 and M-4A3E8 tank units arrived to bolster the Pusan Perimeter and eventually go on the offensive. These armored units eventu- ally grew to create a three or four to one- tank advantage for the United States, which greatly assisted in stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter.20 The Armor School report attributes the arrival of US medium tanks to aiding in the destruction of NKPA armor capabilities, increasing the ROK and US defenders’ firepower, and signifi- cantly increasing ROK and US morale.21 US armor played a critical role in delaying the NKPA and then again in establishing the Pusan Perimeter defensive line. Armor allowed ROK, US, and UN forces to regain their balance and eventually resume offensive operations.
Vietnam: Armor Offense in Urban Terrain The Vietnam War typically invokes thoughts of jungle fighting by infantry- men, helicopters, and napalm against a hybrid enemy that consisted of the con- ventional North Vietnam Army (NVA) and the irregular Viet Cong (VC) forces. US armor and mechanized forces significantly contributed to despite severe terrain and weather restrictions.22 A US Army report published on 28 March 1967 stated, “Mech- anized, infantry, tank and armored and air cavalry equipment is, for the most part, efficient and capable of accomplishing its intended purpose,”23 and highlighted US armor’s effectiveness in search and destroy, clear and secure, and security missions.24 Additionally, US armor played a significant role during urban operations throughout the Vietnam Wat especially during the Battle of Hue in February 1968.
Hue was a historically and politically significant South Vietnamese city to both the North and South Vietnamese. Hue was the ancient imperial capital, center of the Catholic Church in Vietnam, and served as the capital of Thau Thien Province, South Vietnam.25 Hanoi targeted Hue as part of its 1968, Tet Offensive in- tended to break the war’s stalemate. Hanoi wanted to affect the US presidential elec- tion and send the South Vietnamese people the message that their government could not protect them in the country- side nor even in South Vietnam’s major urban areas.26
General Vo Nguyen Giap approved the combined NVA and VC attack against Hue begun on 31 January 1968. The North Vietnamese forces, consisting of VC irregulars, two battalions of sappers, and two regiments of infantry, achieved tact- ical and strategic surprise and quickly seized most of the city.27 Despite the NVA and VC’s initial success throughout the city, they failed to capture their three most important objectives which later enabled the ARVN and US counterattack oper- ation to retake the city.28
Almost immediately following the NVA seizure of Hue, the US Marines counter- attacked back into the city. A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, with a platoon of four M-48 tanks. fought block by block to relieve the MACV compound in Hue.29 As the battle progressed, M-41 light tanks from the 7th Cavalry Squadron (ARVN) also participated in the methodi- cal and deadly urban street fighting.30 US commanders eventually adapted their task organization by pairing M-48 tanks with Ontos recoilless rifle vehicles to provide more effective fire support down to the infantry company and platoon levels.31 The use of armor was especially critical in the initial US counter-offen- sive into Hue when restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) limited the US ability to use supporting air, naval, and artillery fires.32 The M-48 and M-41 tanks used main guns and machine guns to provide effective suppressing fires in support of dismounted marines conducting delib- erate clearance operations in a deadly urban environment.
Historical Perspective Summary Like Janus looking backward in time, these historical vignettes represent a small snapshot of the past use of armor in the INDOPACOM AOR. Independently and collectively, these vignettes illuminate reveal important insights about armor’s historical use in the INDOPACOM AOR. First, armor was pivotal in conducting defensive operations. In the Philippines and Korean vignettes, forward-stationed forces executed delaying operations after adversaries conducted surprise attacks against US forces and partnered nations.
The protection of currently forwardsta- tioned US forces is particularly import- ant because there are over 107,000 US
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