alternative future scenarios derived from threats and opportunities articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).36 The first two scenarios are conventional large scale combat operations (LSCO) between the United States and North Korea and the United States and China. The third alternative future is conven- tional LSCO in support of Taiwan and a thread that runs throughout all three alternative futures is the NDS require- ment for the US military to reassure our allies and partners.37 The section uses concepts from Foresight Infused Strategy to assess future armor roles and missions in MDO based on historical precedent and reasonable future projections.38
Alternative Futures 1 and 2: Conventional LSCO against North Korea and China
These two alternative futures are grouped for their similar armor requirements. LSCO against these near peers requires signifi- cant military effort from the full combined arms team. Initially, armor will deter adversaries from aggressive action while reassuring US allies and partners. Histor- ical analysis of the Philippines and Korea revealed that if deterrence fails, armor will then delay and defend an enemy advance. Forward-stationed forces are critical during competition and crisis to set the conditions for armor forces. US forces will face a numerically superior enemy and will have to defend until addi- tional US combat power can penetrate the enemy A2/AD bubble.
Armor in urban operations is another part of these alternative futures. China specifically is preparing its military to conduct urban warfare with reunification of Taiwan as its goal. It altered its Type 96A main battle tank to operate more effec- tively in urban terrain, cross-designed its Type 15, light tank for amphibious and urban operations among other military reforms to conduct urban operations.39 These cap- abilities could be applied offensively or defensively from China’s perspective during LSCO. These alternative futures are re- presented in the upper right of figure 1, “Alternative Future 1,” is characterized as plausible because it is “based on know- ledge we currently have and our under- standing of how that knowledge will evolve over the next 10–20 years.”40
Fall 2024 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL
Figure 3. Historical Use of Tanks in the Pacific and a Projection on Their Future Use. (Created by author.)
Alternative Future 2 entails an offensive war on China’s mainland. This alternative future is highly unlikely but is still possible because, it “might happen, but we do not have the knowledge right now to make it happen. . . . Never dismiss the possible future without exploring its implications first, because it can become reality more quickly than you think.”41 Armor would first deter then delay and defend in these alternative futures.
Alternative Future 3: Conventional LSCO in Support of Taiwan Alternative Future 3 entails the previously mentioned armor mission sets and a potential requirement to conduct a JFE with armor support. Historical JFEs in INDOPACOM were amphibious in nature due to the AOR’s significant maritime character.42 This mission needs a lighter tank than the currently fielded M1A1 Abrams tank. This alternative future will also include a large urban operations part armor would be featured in. This alterna- tive future would require the increased production of tanks, parts, mechanics, and operators/trainers. In this alternate future the US could support Tawain with war material in a similar way it has with Ukraine after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. This alternative future is categorized as plausible because due to China’s stated goal of reunification and the US policy of strategic ambiguity toward the issue.
Conclusion
As Janus looks to the past and future uses of armor in the INDOPACOM AOR,
how does that understanding inform armor’s role in MDO for the present? First, the insights from the past are magni- fied and reinforced. Armor is a crucial part in the combined arms team that is needed to effectively delay enemy forces, to defend, and to execute urban opera- tions. Secondly, the integration and de- pendency between the army and joint force is amplified when armor is commit- ted to military operations in the region.43 Strategic lift, logistics, fires, command and control, and maintenance will all be strained and require demanding and rou- tine joint exercises to train and rehearse the intricacies of moving, employing, and sustaining armor in the theater and all phases of the competition continuum.
Specific armor capabilities will evolve and adapt to changes by threats in the operating environment (OE) and changes in the character of warfare. Modifications, such as increasing armor’s situational awareness capabilities, survivability from increasingly deadly AT weapons, and armor’s ability to incorporate AI and addi- tional networking features onto their plat- forms, will be critical moving forward.44 However, General Starry’s commentary in this section’s epigraph about the tank’s relevancy as an effective weapon system following the Yom Kippur is instructive. Although it might not be “Forever Tanks,” Janus shows us that at least for the near future there are multiple roles for armor in the INDOPACOM AOR.
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