armies maneuvering against one another are a thing of the past.
According to Army Doctrine Publication: Operations (ADP 3-0), “Large-Scale Combat Operations are extensive joint combat in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a cam- paign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives” (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-5). In other words, LSCOs are inherently Multi-Domain (MD) and Joint Operations that involve fighting corps and divisions against near-peer threats across domains utilizing ground and air forces, as observed in the Russian -Ukraine conflict. The ability to fight across services and cooperate with partner and allied nations is vital. For ex- ample, the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- ization (NATO) has 32 member countries participating in a military and political alliance, each operating under their own governmental oversight and directives. Understanding their processes, proce- dures, and capabilities is a starting point; integrating with them wherever possible will be key to success against a pacing threat like Russia.
The last time the United States Army conducted LSCO was during the initial phase of the Iraq invasion in 2003 (Greer, 2022). Unlike the war in Iraq, forces en- gaged in the Russian-Ukraine conflict are wearing the uniforms of their nation and employing tactics both new to modern warfare and reminiscent of World War I, such as fighting from trenches, conduct- ing reconnaissance with small drones, and employing electronic warfare mea- sures to direct artillery fire using cellular signals. The tactics observed in this fight are still emerging and discussed across multiple echelons. However, there is one observation that requires little debate: the need for diverse, multi-layered air defenses to counter the proliferation of air threats.
The Multi-Domain LSCO study produced by the US Army Combined Arms Center identified the 17 most critical organiza- tional capability/capacity gaps to prevent defeat in an MD-LSCO conflict. Number 7 of these 17 LSCO gaps was the lack of M-SHORAD and Intermediate ADA to pro- tect the maneuver force (Walker, 2023). Additionally, the Army published its FY
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U.S. Army soldiers with 173rd Airborne Brigade fire MANPADs on a fixed-wing aerial drone target during exercise Shield 24 Apr. 12 in Pula, Croatia. This annual event bolsters Croatian air defense capabilities against low and medium-altitude threats. Joined by international partners, including the Polish, Slovenian, and French Armed Forces, the exercise emphasizes air defense tactics and live-fire engagements. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Yesenia Cadavid)
2024 President’s Budget Highlights, which discusses their modernization strategy. Air and missile defense is the sixth priority for Army Futures Command, focusing on directed energy and indirect fire capabili- ties (Assistant Secretary of the Army, 2024). Possessing these protective capabilities will be vital to fighting and surviving as a corps or division element in future conflicts.
Attrition of the Force
The Army is currently structured to main- tain troop levels at 494,000 Soldiers and plans to reduce this number over the next five years to 470,000 Soldiers. Some leaders argue that the current force is already too small, at “only 10 divisions and 31 brigade combat teams for a multi- campaign fight” (Hooker, 2022). To further articulate the problem, in an article pub- lished by the Associated Press the Army will restructure the active force by re- ducing targeted MOSs, such as 31B and 19D, eliminating empty or unfilled posi- tions, and significantly reducing personnel in the Special Operations Command. Over- all, the reduction will result in the loss of 24,000 positions, or about 5% of the force (Baldor, 2024). All of this is happening amid two major conflicts – Israel-Gaza and Russia-Ukraine – while China threa- tens to reclaim Taiwan.
In an article published by the Associa- tion of the United States Army (AUSA) in 2022, noted that “only 11 of the Army’s 31 active maneuver brigades are heavy brigades. Thirteen of the Army’s maneu- ver brigades are light infantry formations, ill-equipped to contend with Russian, Chinese, or North Korean heavy forces and massed artillery” (Hooker, 2022). These data points are important to consider when discussing the Army’s ability to win in the LSCO environment. The shrinking of the Army is not only a mandate from Congress but also a direct result of failed recruiting and retention programs.
Job satisfaction matters and has a direct impact on the retention of talent. A CNN article stated that “the US Army’s air defense units are among the most over- worked in the US military, manning sys- tems across the globe to provide around -the-clock deterrence against adversar- ies including North Korea, China, Iran, and Russia.” In the same article, LTG Dan Karbler, who was the senior ranking air defense officer at the time, relayed a con- cern from a Sergeant: “Sir, it’s simple, pure math. We have more missions than we have air defense capability” (Britzky, 2023). To put it plainly, the operational tempo of the Army is exceeding the capa-
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