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to develop a light armor wheeled capa- bility for amphibious assaults, the advan- tages of early armor on the Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa beaches are currently not attainable.30


Given these shortfalls, the US military should match its pacing challenge by developing the operational concepts and capabilities for armored warfare in the Pacific. First, mounted maneuver forces must recognize that the logic of domain control may shift in a current conflict. Air, naval, space, and cyber capabilities may only create a limited window in which to project armored forces on land, but this may be neces- sary to achieve the destruction of the enemy’s system controlling these do- mains. Armored forces are well suited to exploit this window of opportunity, but must refine armored concepts and training for such a role. Second, once armored forces reach land, they must focus on the disruption, disintegration, and destruction of the enemy system contesting the other domains. Although destruction of land forces is part of this mission, the focus must be on destroy- ing enemy nodes that contest air, naval, cyber, and space domains to realize the synergistic effects of Multidomain Oper- ations. This will widen the window of opportunity for the joint force and extend the range at which allied forces can pro- ject across all domains. Lastly, to achieve the aforementioned effects, armored forces must begin exploring the tactical and technical ways by which this can be achieved. Accepting the M10 Booker as a medium armored platform and ex- ploring how we will project armor in an amphibious assault are but two key topics to explore regarding projecting armor in the Pacific. When facing a near-peer threat with domain superiority, US forces should explore and innovate upon all available means while simultaneously developing future capabilities for emerging concepts.


Conclusion


The 1942-45 Pacific Campaign offers im- portant insights for armored warfare in the maritime domain. FM 3-0 dedicates an entire chapter to this environment, mentions no roles or considerations for armored forces. History asserts other- wise, and fortunately the Allied Pacific Campaign of WWII offers valuable insights.


10


Constraints of terrain and physical space remain as relevant today as then. Limited suitable beaches, constricted terrain, dense vegetation, soft soils, and imprac- ticable sustainment distances threaten to unilaterally unravel armored forces. These can be overcome by extending operational reach through land control and basing, but it must be fought for. In 1942-45, land and sea power achieved dominance, then land forces achieved control and extended the Allies’ operat- ional reach, driving them to victory in the Pacific. Tactically, doctrinal and concep- tual adaptation toward combined arms enabled the Allies to achieve this control and overcome the Japanese defenses. To overcome contemporary challenges of armor in the Pacific, the US army must conceptually adapt again. At the opera- tional level, armored forces must develop the concepts and capabilities to rapidly exploit a limited window of opportunity created from other domains, then rapidly disintegrate the enemy system utilizing the firepower, mobility, and protection advan- tages inherent to armor. Practitioners should look to the 1942-45 Pacific Cam- paign for important lessons for armored warfare and operational evolution in the twenty-first century.


MAJ Chris Jarrett is an active-duty In- fantry officer and graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Lea- venworth, KS. He is a 2023 graduate of the Art of War Scholars program and holds and MMAS from the Command and Gen- eral Staff College, an MPA from the Har- vard Kennedy School. He commissioned from the United States Military Academy in 2012. He has served as Small Group Leader, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Ft. Moore, GA; Commander, HHT, 1-33 CAV, 3 BCT, 101st, Ft. Campbell, KY; Com- mander, C Troop, 1-33 CAV, 3 BCT, 101st, Ft. Campbell, KY; AS3, 4-23 IN, 2 SBCT, 7 ID, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. He is a graduate of Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, 2016, Ft. Benning, GA; Air Assault, Rappel Master Course, 2017, Ft. Campbell, KY; Ranger School, Airborne School, Pathfinder School, Stryker Leader Course 2012-13, Ft. Benning, GA. He is a husband and father of four.


Notes 1 Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines Washington, DC: Center of Military His- tory, United States Army, 1989, 32.


2 Mike Guardia, American Armor in the Pacific Havertown, PA: Casemate Pub- lishers, 2020, 4-5.


3 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2020), 7-2.


4 “Landing Craft Air Cushion,” Military. Com, accessed March 7, 2024, https: //www.military.com/equipment/land ing-craft-air-cushion#:~:text=The%20 Landing%20Craft%20Air%20Cushion ,amphibious%20ship%20to%20the %20beach


5 Thomas Fisher, “Milne Bay, Papua. 1942-09. Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go Tanks Used in Abortive Landing,” Australian War Memorial, Last modified Septem- ber 1942, https://www.awm.gov.au/ collection/C10261.


6 Japanese Tank and Antitank Warfare, 34 Washington, DC: Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 1945, 92.


7 Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Pacific Island Defenses: 1941-45 Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2003, 23-24; Douglas MacAr- thur, Reports of General MacArthur. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994, 262.


8 Guardia, American Armor in the Pa- cific, 85.


9 Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1991, 159-160.


10 Winston, Pacific Wrecks, Last modified January 31, 1945, https://pacificwrecks. com/tank/type95-ha-go/san_manuel/ san-manuel-1-31-45.html.


11 Guardia, American Armor in the Pa- cific, 123.


12 Gordon D. Gayle, Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2019, 12-14.


13 MacArthur, Reports of General Mac- Arthur, 271.


14 MacArthur, Reports of General Mac- Arthur, 288.


CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024


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