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developed throughout the length of an officer’s career and not just occur while the Soldier is a student enrolled in PME.


Develop, Evaluate Doctrine The consistent and deep study of military history equips military professionals to better understand, implement, evaluate, and develop U.S. Army doctrine. In the shadow of our wars in Iraq and Afghani- stan and as we shift to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), it is the perfect time for the Army to reflect, learn, and review our current doctrine. In 2010 Robert Scales warned against the failure to maintain a learning organization by stating, “my sense is that the military has begun to circle X its officer seed corn. A bias toward active service in our protracted small wars is making our military an institution too busy to learn.”4 Scales warned against an emphasis on action over education and offered ways the Army could promote and reward scholarship for military profes- sionals. The continuous exploration of military history will equip military profes- sionals to develop more effective doctrine and provide leaders with additional lenses to view the effectiveness of our current doctrine.


Studying the evolution of our military doctrine will provide context for military leaders currently trying to understand the Army’s new operating concept – multi- domain operations (MDO).5 Military his- tory will equip leaders with an appreciation of the historical consistencies within MDO and better illuminate what is new and different in the doctrine. This under- standing will allow leaders to better analyze if and how our MDO concept addresses the current operational environ- ment or the challenges our pacing threats pose to our ability to conduct successful military operations.


This could require military professionals to progressively work on a thesis project throughout their career, periodically pub- lish in professional journals, or require top performers to teach, observe-coach, or develop doctrine periodically through- out their career.


The need to evaluate and develop better military doctrine is not the sole respon- sibility of Combined Arms Doctrine Direc- torate doctrine writers and developers. All Army professionals owe it to their units


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and the force to evaluate doctrine’s effec- tiveness when conducting home station collective-level training or a combat training center (CTC) rotation. Feedback from the force of doctrine applied to train- ing or while operating allows leaders to strengthen our doctrine by understand- ing what does and doesn’t work. Addition- ally, CTC observer/coach/trainers (O/C/T) and PME instructors should be heavily grounded in military history to better assist them in their official duties and should actively promote historical exam- ples as a way of relating and connecting experiences of their training audience to the greater historical legacy their opera- tions originated from.


Learn From Others Lastly, and more commonly, military his- tory is a great tool to train military profes- sionals without having to conduct military operations. This benefit can be imple- mented as an annual training type require- ment or like the mechanisms discussed in previous paragraphs. Military profes- sionals should have an area of expertise that assists them in better understanding the complex character of warfare and exercises their judgement by replicat- ing future situations they may find them- selves in.


Clausewitz’s concept of coup d’oeil, or inward eye, refers to the “quick recogni- tion of a truth that the mind would ordin- arily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.”6 All Army professionals should develop and cul- tivate their individual coup d’oeil regard- less of their duty position as a commander, staff officer, or functional area officer. Deep and deliberate study of military history is one of the best ways to develop your individual coup d’oeil. Studying mil- itary history and exploring what others have done in similar situations builds your ability to recognize “the truth” in any military context. It is important that Clausewitz highlighted “long study and reflection” as the means to develop coup d’oeil and not training or practical exper- ience. Long study and reflection can come after training and personal experience, but the unlimited opportunity to learn from others through the study of military history is what the great theorist was re- ferring to.


Conclusion The study of military history to empower the current Army professional is an under- appreciated tool that should be empha- sized and leveraged in every unit’s leader development program and in individual self-development programs. Studying history can be intimidating for some who may not know how to begin their journey or may be hesitant in not wanting to draw the wrong lessons or insights from his- torical experience. Antulio Echevarria II expertly cautioned against some of the troubles and pitfalls of studying military history in his article titled “The Trouble with History.”7 However, his warning is no excuse not to incorporate deep and meaning study of military history in PME. Nor does Echevarria’s warning abdicate our leaders’ responsibility to leverage the benefits of studying military history throughout their careers.


The long-term study of military history will benefit military professionals by improving their critical- and creative- thinking skills, improving their ability to evaluate, implement, and develop doctrine and act as a training and education tool during periods of low OPTEMPO. The study of military history is greater than the ability to recall historical facts or extrap- olate solutions from previous historical examples to solve current military prob- lems. The prominent professor Michael Howard said it the best: “It must never be forgotten that the true use of history, mil- itary or civil, is, as Jacob Burckhardt once said, ‘not to make men clever for the next time: it is to make them wise forever.’”8


MAJ Shameek De Lancey is an Infantry officer who is currently serving as a G5 Planner in the 4th Infantry Division station- ed at Fort Carson, Colorado. MAJ De Lancey most recently graduated from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and also the Command and Gen- eral Staff College as an Art of War Scholar. His previous assignments include serving in the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division; in the 4th Battal- ion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division; as aide-de-camp for the 10th Mountain Division commanding general; and as a small group leader with the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course at Fort Benning, GA (known as Fort Moore since 2023). Major De Lancey has had two deployments to Afghanistan in support of Operation


CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024


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