Historic Lessons for the Indo-Pacific Fight 2024 Starry Writing Competition Third Place Essay
Pacific Tanks MAJ Stephen Cumby
The U.S. National Security Strategy (October 2022) identified China as the current pacing threat. Published near simultaneously, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 now defines the Army’s role maritime environment joint fight. Additionally, with the divestiture of tanks from the Marine Corps, the Army is now the sole provider of tanks to “find, fix, close with, and de- stroy… through combinations of mobility; precise, lethal, and overwhelming fire- power, and devastating shock effect,” and will bear the responsibility and privi- lege of employing those formations in an Indo-Pacific theater.1
A significant shift from preparing for oper- ations in Europe or the Caucasus, U.S. history provides ample examples of suc- cessful armor employment throughout the Indo-Pacific. From World War II (WWII) to Vietnam, U.S. forces committed armor throughout the entire region. Each example offers valuable insight into specific mis- sions, roles, and operations conducted by mounted forces, and how they navigated the theater’s complexities. Specifically, U.S. armor in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Vietnam facilitated, or outright accomplished, the FM 3-0 operational considerations for the Army in a maritime environment, through the asymmetric application, unique task organization, and early projection into the theater of mounted forces. This essay briefly explores a few roles and missions from these cam- paigns through the framework of FM 3-0’s chapter seven and concludes with recom- mendations.
Background and Definitions FM 3-0 prescribes two maneuver-centric operational considerations for the Army in support of the joint force in a maritime environment. First, “defeating components of enemy anti-access and area denial to enable joint offensive operations” through forcible entry and theater missile defense. Second, to “defend and control key terrain”
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pertinent to the joint fight (islands, air and naval bases, and forward-postured force locations).2 Although unstated, a third implied consideration is seizing key ter- rain. These considerations provide general expectations of what missions the Army will execute in an Indo-Pacific fight and refine how we interpret the historic refer- ences for armored employment.
Asymmetry in warfare is often applied to insurgency or guerilla tactics, largely due to its first use in joint doctrine in 1995 as a war between two dissimilar forces. However, later publications defined stra- tegic asymmetry as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advan- tages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater free- dom of action.”3 This definition highlights how the U.S. employed armor in previous Indo-Pacific conflicts, and is how it is used in the following discussion.
The Indo-Pacific maintains the largest U.S. combatant command, covering nearly half the surface of the world. The immense biological and geographical diversity of the region ranges from vast deserts to tropical forests and includes the urban capacity to house roughly half of the world’s population.4 The dense vegeta- tion, water, and mega-cities of the region generally skew thoughts of tank employ- ment, however, studies during the Vietnam War investigated mounted maneuverabil- ity and provided contrary data.
A 1967 study concluded nearly 50% of the country was suitable for armored employment, with most of the unsuitable terrain concentrated in poorly drained deltas congested with stagnant streams, rivers, and marshes. The remainder of the region’s jungles, tropical forests, coastal plains, and agricultural terrain (rice pad- dies, cultivated fields, and plantations) proved capable of armored maneuver.5 This study, paired with U.S. mounted operations in islands across the Pacific
and in deserts from the early 90s to our recent conflicts, confirms the suitability of mounted maneuvers throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Equally relevant in maritime operations, the FM 3-0 operational framework of deep, close, and rear area operations is key in differentiating where and who is providing certain effects.6 For example, as corps and divisions mass effects to shape the deep fight, significantly fewer assets re- main available to shape the close fight. This limitation creates a unique problem, which the asymmetric application of tanks historically solved.
Seizing Key Terrain – The 1945 Fight to Manila, Luzon Campaign During WWII American forces fought from island to island across the Pacific, extending their operational reach to Japan. The March 1945 victory in the Philippines provided the necessary air and naval infrastructure to reach Okinawa, a crucial step in reaching the Japanese. A successful forcible entry at Leyte in December 1944, followed by Luzon in January 1945, set conditions for the U.S. to retake the Philippines. However, after extending the lodgment and transitioning to the offense, American forces faced defended mountains, valleys, and plains from the northern landing to the southern city of Manila.7 Between advantageous terrain features and valuable infrastruc- ture within the cities, seizing key terrain drove how the Sixth Army achieved its objectives of establishing air and naval facilities, seizing the central plains and Manila, and then clearing the remaining enemy.8
Seizing key terrain, although not specified in FM 3-0’s considerations for maritime operations, is reasonably inferred from the other two referenced points. If the Army in a joint fight in the Indo-Pacific routinely conducts forcible entries to defeat enemy area denial and defends and controls key terrain, then seizure of
CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Fall 2024
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