small-scale (dismount squad and platoon) units reacting to SUAS.2 Of particular note is that both the battle drill and the entire training support package are available online from the Army training website.3 The training support package includes lesson plans, performance checklists, and instructional videos4 to aid commanders in determining the best approach to de- veloping training to reach their training objectives. While the training material at hand is sponsored by and designed for dismounted infantry, many of the consid- erations are directly applicable to dis- mounted cavalry scouts and can be indirectly applied to mounted maneuver forces.
Specific to the Armor community, however, there is further work to be done in the codification of react to SUAS battle drills for mounted forces. While current doctrine and tasks exist that discuss the appro- priate actions for lower echelon (i.e., section and platoon) reaction to air attacks,5 there is nothing that captures doctrine for how a mounted force should react to SUAS contact. This distinction is import- ant because the nature of the mounted force differs significantly from the dis- mounted force. For example, scouts in an observation post (OP) along a screen line may not want to engage SUAS with direct fires because doing so could give away their location. Similarly, tanks in a hide position (while conducting a defense) may be better able to survive if they do not engage or disperse, provided their vehicle camouflage is sufficient to the task. Either way, as unit leaders consider how to accomplish the training objec- tives considering the current doctrine on reacting to SUAS – which is focused pri- marily on dismounted infantry forces – it bears noting that the mounted force mis- sion brings inherently different focus areas than our light or dismounted infantry counterparts.
Approaches to Integrating SUAS Considering the two broad uses of SUAS – as either red air (aggressor) or blue air (defense) – suggests several approaches to integrating SUAS into unit level training. It stands to reason that these approach- es will be dependent on the size, scale, and type of SUAS involved – one cannot integrate a RQ-11B Raven the same way as a small-scale drone quadcopter.
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First, and perhaps the most obvious ap- proach, is simply to get your unit level SUAS into the air. This applies equally to red air or blue air training objectives. While this approach may be the most obvious approach, however, it may not be the simplest approach. To fly SUAS in support of either red or blue training, units must often navigate several hurdles. One of the most difficult hurdles to navigate may simply be the lack of available SUAS. Even if the equipment is on hand, it still requires qualified personnel to operate the SUAS. Even with equipment and oper- ators on hand there is no guarantee that the equipment will work, meaning that units must execute regular maintenance on their SUAS and proper pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections prior to using it.
Barring equipment, maintenance, and trained operators, other unit leaders must also consider other factors such as airspace requests, land requests, and weather, all of which may detract from a units’ ability to effectively employ its SUAS. Once the SUAS is employed, however, units can begin achieving their training objectives, whether it is conditioning dis- mounted forces to look up and listen while on patrol or validating vehicle “air guard” positions during mounted maneuver.
The second approach applies primarily to use of SUAS in a “red air” context. Often individual Soldiers and unit leaders do not fully appreciate the importance of maintaining movement spacing or basic noise and light discipline. One way to reinforce these fundamental basics is to fly the SUAS over friendly forces and start audio/visual recordings. The unit leadership can then pull aside the training audience and show them the audio/visual recordings to help them understand what an enemy SUAS could have seen. This is a similar practice to what observer/coach /trainers (O/C/Ts) at combat training centers do when they pull unit leadership aside to show them just how far their noise and light signatures travel at night.
Third, if the training, equipment, or wea- ther conditions do not allow for the use of SUAS, units can still achieve some of their training objectives by replicating the audio signatures of SUAS’s from a red air perspective. One example of this
could include using small-scale gas-pow- ered engines (i.e., weed eaters) or other audio recordings for stationary units. Whether or not the training audience sees a visual SUAS, the audio signature should trigger a similar response and help achieve the training objective.
Fourth, and from a primarily blue air per- spective, the continued prevalence of SUAS on the modern battlefield means that blue forces should feel equally com- fortable requesting and employing SUAS. This means that SUAS integration into training should not be limited to “react to SUAS,” but it also should include “employ- ment of SUAS.” Our dismounted cavalry scouts should feel equally comfortable employing an SUAS drone as they do an M240 in a dismounted OP. Vehicles in a concealed position should feel comfort- able using SUAS to cover dead space in a defense or screen. If we accept the premise that SUAS is a valid sensor, then mounted and dismounted scouts in a screen should be trained to use SUAS to initiate and observe indirect fire missions. The need to integrate SUAS into this is further exacerbated in urban operations, which present significant challenges to mounted maneuver forces. The integra- tion of small-scale disposable SUAS drones into our mounted forces should be considered to mitigate combat losses in urban terrain.
Fifth, and lastly, integration of SUAS from a blue air perspective should also consider how SUAS can be used as a diversion or deception operation. Much like individuals can telegraph their move- ments, the use of SUAS to clear areas can potentially telegraph future move- ment of mounted or dismounted forces. Based on this, however, the use of small -scale disposable SUAS drones as a de- ception element can cause the enemy forces to reallocate forces to disadvan- tageous positions. Similarly, the current doctrine on reacting to SUAS includes the passive measure of dispersal when reacting to SUAS.6 Blue forces may look at using SUAS to similarly displace en- trenched enemy forces as a precursor to direct fire engagement. If we currently have quad-copter drones that can deliver packages,7 those same drones can drop grenades and other munitions to disrupt or displace enemy maneuver forces.
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