of Staff of the Army GEN Malin Craig. MG Fuqua’s view was that “tanks did not prove themselves in separate offensive operations because they were effectively challenged by anti-tank weapons.”9 Fuqua was supported in his view by British and French associates who, “concluded their only value was in support of the attacking infantry.”10 MG Lynch expressed similar sentiments, believing the “accepted use of tanks had been largely discredited” by the Spanish Civil War.11 Lynch declared, “The infantry tank has just one primary mission: the neutralization of machine guns… It has paid for itself if it succeeds in eliminating this obstacle to the rifleman’s advance.” MG Lynch’s conclusion was that “the tank is a powerful auxiliary.”12
Informed by such perspectives of high- ranking officers, GEN Malin Craig, offered the conclusion of the U.S. Army’s obser- vation of the performance of tanks in Spain in testimony to a congressional subcommittee. He related that, “tanks were not successful due to anti-tank wea- pons, insufficient armor, and mechanical defects, tactical errors in their employ- ment especially enmasse, and inade- quate support from artillery and tactical aviation.”13 Regarding the acquisition of new tanks, GEN Craig advocated for “a type suitable for close support of [the] infantry,” in his December 1937 dated Report of the Chief of Staff.14 Thus, the U.S. Army’s underlying conclusion from the Spanish Civil War was that the role
of tanks in future war was akin to the infantry support role they fulfilled during World War I, rather than as a weapon massed to break through and push deep beyond enemy lines.
In contrast to this, the Germans left Spain with much different conclusions. Regard- ing the threat of anti-tank guns, German MAJ Adolf Von Schell observed that due to a lack of organic anti-tank guns, most of the world’s infantry formations could not actually halt an attack of massed tanks.15 Furthermore, he noted that the anti-tank guns the infantry possessed were relatively weak, but upgrading to larger calibers would only inhibit the mo- bility of these infantry formations.16 He concluded that the solution to this problem was in fact the tank itself, which could mount a larger gun while retaining mo- bility.17 Thus, while the U.S. Army con- tinued to advocate for light tanks to meth- odically support the infantry’s advance, the German Army developed tanks with larger guns and heavier armor, designed to go head to head with other tanks and cut deep into the enemy’s rear.18 The les- sons the Germans took from the Spanish Civil War manifested in the development of tanks that, in terms of firepower and protection, American tank theorists did not believe were even possible at the time.19
To be sure, there were officers in the U.S. Army that did not accept the views of high-ranking generals such as Fuqua,
Lynch, and Craig. Going back to the 1920’s, Infantry and Cavalry officers like BG Frank Parker, COL Daniel Van Voorhis, and BG Adna Chaffee advocated for combined arms formations of armored vehicles to be employed in mass to penetrate the front line and attack enemy rear areas.20 They had dutifully observed foreign army experiments and experimented in armored tactics, techniques, and procedures with their own formations. The Depression era lack of resources for the military, as well as isolationist sentiments ended their ex- periments and severely curtailed their theories.21 Despite these setbacks, offi- cers such as these continued to articu- late their theories of the role of tanks in future warfare, though their story is be- yond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, when the Germans surprised the U.S. Army establishment with their victorious blitzkriegs, the U.S. Army quickly turned to its own armor enthusiasts like BG Chaf- fee to quickly correct its shortfalls and prepare for the war that was coming.22
For armies around the world, the period between the world wars was a time of innovation and experimentation, as well as one of misinterpretation and stagna- tion. Like others, the U.S. Army experi- enced its own doctrinal journey to World War II. However, during one of the best interwar opportunities to learn about the role of tanks in ground warfare, the U.S. Army drew the wrong conclusions. The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 represents a lost opportunity to learn about the role of armor in future warfare. Yet, during this same time the Germans took away the correct lessons and used these to improve their tanks and armored forces in preparation for their blitzkrieg campaigns only a few years later. Only the shock of the German success in these campaigns would finally awaken the U.S. Army to the great potential of the tank and armored formations. It would be a long and extre- mely hard fight before American armored forces bested those of the Germans.
M3 Light tank going through a water obstacle, Fort Knox, Kentucky. (Photo courtesy of the United States Library of Congress)
Spring 2026 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL
MAJ Michael A. Hanson is a Company Commander for the Warrant Officer Basic Course at The Basic School in Quantico, VA. His previous assignments include serving as Company Commander for Company A at the Basic Officer Course, The Basic School, Quantico, VA; Company Commander for Weapons Company &
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