Learning the Wrong Lessons The Influence of Tanks in the Spanish Civil War on the U.S. Army
MAJ Michael Hanson, USMC
The Interwar Period of 1919-1939 repre- sents an era of both stagnation and inno- vation, where militaries around the world prepared for their own disparate visions of future warfare. Towards the end of this period, the Spanish Civil War offered a glimpse of the nature of future combat, and several nations used it as a labora- tory to test equipment and ideas that would inform how they should fight in the next great conflict. Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union all sent advisors and equipment to Spain, ultimately a proxy conflict between their competing ideo- logies.Other countries, such as the United States, sent observers and studied reports detailing the combat. Despite this great opportunity, the United States Army drew the wrong conclusions in tank employ- ment from the Spanish Civil War. These incorrect conclusions stunted the devel- opment of tanks and armored doctrine in the U.S. Army, leaving the American Army less prepared for the war that would come than the Germans who came away from Spain with better conclusions on the em- ployment of armor. This paper will examine the lessons of armored employment in the Spanish Civil War and trace where U.S. Army thought diverged from the conclus- ions of the Germans.
Conventional wisdom recalls that, since its introduction during the First World War, the tank has been universally known as the decisive weapon of combat on land. However, this simple narrative misremem- bers history. A clearer memory would grant the tank this honor only after the success of the German blitzkriegs during the Second World War. The period between the world wars witnessed great, and some- times bitter, debates between theorists in the armies of Great Britain, France, Ger- many, the Soviet Union, and the United States about the role of the tank in future combat.1 These debates generally repre- sented two schools of thought. The first saw the role of the tank largely unchanged
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from how it was employed during the First World War, as a direct support weapon to the infantry, a moving heavy weapons platform to reduce enemy strongpoints and enable the infantry’s advance.2 The other school saw the tank as a vehicle capable of independent action, a weapon that could penetrate the front line and drive deep beyond, wreaking havoc in the enemy’s rear.3 The U.S. Army counted proponents of both schools within its ranks, though disciples of the first school would dominate some of the highest posi- tions of the Army even after the start of World War II.
During the interwar period, however, a vigorous debate occurred between the two camps, informed by theoretical wri- ting, observations of other militaries, and testing of concepts and equipment in of- ficial experiments. Where each camp agreed though, was that the design of tanks had evolved since the First World War. During that war, tanks were large and slow, offering easy targets to defending artillery employed in direct fire mode.4
Interwar theory and experimentation in the U.S. Army up until the mid-1930’s had settled on lighter tanks, which though lightly armored, possessed great speed and maneuverability. American theorists believed superior mobility would offer tanks the protection they needed against enemy fire.5
When civil war broke out in Spain, the U.S. Army watched closely and contin- ued its internal discussion. Reports from
Spain soon contradicted the assertions put forth by American tank theorists. Ac- cording to CPT Hayden Sears, “It had been conclusively demonstrated that the lightly armored, high-speed tank was of … no value against an organized posi- tion, … In fact, in all cases where Russian tanks had engaged German and Italian tanks, the heavier armor and armament of the Russians had made them superior. Power, heavier armor, and armament had come forward as decisive qualities, rather than excessive speed.”6
These comments reflected the physical characteristics of individual tanks, namely their armament, armor, and speed. The employment of tanks as units produced similar criticisms, namely that because tanks in such cases, as described by CPT Sears, had not been employed in mass but largely individually or in small groups, this method of employment al- lowed opposing anti-tank gunners to focus their fires on few or even lone tanks.7 Likewise, the U.S. Army concluded that anti-tank guns would serve an outsized role in future combat, and placed its im- portance ahead of that of the tank.8
These thoughts held stock at the highest echelons of the Army by such influential leaders as the former Chief of the Infantry and then Military Attache to Spain MG Stephen Fuqua, then Chief of the Infantry MG George Lynch, and even then, Chief
CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Spring 2026
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