Lessons from the Battlefield (Part 1) The Consequences of Neglecting Reconnaissance


LTC Patrick O’Brien Boling PhD Dr. Paul Sanders PhD CPT Carter Shields


Editor’s Note: This is the second in a series of four articles from these authors. The first article, “The Erosion of the Army’s Eyes and Ears: The U.S. Army’s Restruc- turing and Its Risks to Reconnaissance,” appeared in the Winter 2026 Cavalry & Armor Journal.


Abstract


This article examines historical instances where the absence or reduction of ground reconnaissance, security, and surveil- lance (RSS) capabilities led to significant operational failures, increased casual- ties, and strategic vulnerabilities, while also analyzing how technological advances threatened to eliminate or revolutionized cavalry and RSS. It covers campaigns from the Philippine-American War (Battle of Manila, 1899), the Moro Rebellion (Battle of Bud Dajo, 1906), World War I (Battle of Audregnies), World War II (Maginot Line, Battle of Kasserine Pass and Leyte Campaign), the Korean War (Task Force Smith), the Vietnam War (Tet Offensive and Operation Igloo White), the Cold War (U-2 Spy Plane Downing), the Sino-Vietnamese War (Battle of Lang So’n), small wars (Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada), Operation Desert Storm, and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with Predator and Reaper drones. These cases highlight the critical role of human-led ground RSS and the risks of neglecting it, as well as the dual impact of technol- ogy in threatening and enhancing these capabilities. Crucially, this is not the first time in military history that emerging technology has generated arguments for the wholesale elimination of ground RSS – and in every prior instance, those argu- ments proved premature. The lessons underscore the enduring necessity of ground reconnaissance and caution against the U.S. Army’s 2030 restructur- ing, which risks diminishing these capa- bilities in favor of technological solutions. This article is the second in a series; the


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first examined the present-day restruc- turing and its operational risks, and a follow-on article will explore how the absence of ground RSS has manifested in real-world leadership failures and battlefield consequences.


Thesis Statement


Historical campaigns from the Philippine- American War, the Moro Rebellion, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Sino-Viet- namese War, small wars, Operation Desert Storm, and the Global War on Terror de- monstrate that neglecting ground RSS leads to operational failures and increased casualties, while technological advances have both threatened to eliminate and revolutionized these capabilities, empha- sizing the need for a balanced approach in modern restructuring efforts.


I. Introduction: The Price of Oversight and the Power of Adaptation


Ground reconnaissance, security, and surveillance (RSS) units remain the U.S. Army’s “eyes and ears,” essential for delivering intelligence and preventing surprise attacks. Historically, however, a recurring pattern has emerged: neglect- ing these human-led capabilities in favor of technological optimism has frequently led to significant battlefield failures. Con- versely, the integration of advanced technology with traditional RSS does not replace the human element; instead, it amplifies and revolutionizes battlefield effectiveness.


This pattern is especially sobering be- cause of its historical consistency. Time and again, proponents of new technolo- gies – from the repeating rifle and the machine gun to modern sensor networks and drones – have argued that human ground reconnaissance is finally obsolete. These claims have been consistently disproven. At great cost in both blood and resources, the Army has repeatedly been forced to relearn a fundamental lesson: technology is a multiplier of human reconnaissance, not a replacement for


it. The current debate regarding the Army 2030 restructuring and the integration of UAS and AI is simply the latest iteration of a cycle that has persisted since 1899. This article examines pivotal failures where diminished ground RSS turned potential advantages into vulnerabilities. We analyze cases ranging from the early counterinsurgencies in Manila and at Bud Dajo to the strategic blindness of the Maginot Line, the sensor-only fail- ures of Operation Igloo White in Vietnam and the overconfidence in GWOT-era drone operations. These examples span eras, demonstrating that while techno- logical threats evolve, the necessity of human confirmation remains constant.1


Building on the findings of our previous article – which documented the reduc- tion of cavalry squadrons and the reclass- ification of thousands of 19D Cavalry Scouts – this analysis provides the his- torical evidence for modern concerns. By drawing on declassified documents and military histories, we underscore how dismissing human-led RSS risks repeating the mistakes of the past in favor of unproven UAS and AI-driven solutions.


II. Firepower Without Awareness: The Decline of Scouts in Early Counterinsurgency


Manila (1899) and Bud Dajo (1906): Terrain Ignored, Intelligence Absent The Philippine-American War (1899 - 1902) illustrates the consequences of inadequate ground RSS in a counterin- surgency context. During the Battle of Manila (February 4-5, 1899), U.S. forces under General Elwell Otis sought to cap- ture the city from Filipino insurgents led by Emilio Aguinaldo. The U.S. Army, tran- sitioning from horse cavalry to infantry -centric tactics due to the advent of re- peating rifles, relied heavily on static outposts and limited cavalry scouts.2 The 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, tasked with advancing into Manila, lacked suf- ficient ground reconnaissance to detect Filipino defensive positions in the city’s outskirts.3


CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Spring 2026


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