training, and the field service represen- tatives - to enable it.
Leaders at echelon should also take heed of this warning from a 1997 report: “As communication technology has im- proved, so has the demand for informa- tion at the headquarters level. When these demands from headquarters are not synchronized with the work ongoing in units that are engaged in battle, the communication process itself can reduce battle effectiveness by diverting leader attention and by adding stress to an al- ready overstressed situation.”5 Through frank conversations to address short- comings and set clear expectations, lead- ers can mitigate this risk and address the challenge of data overload.
Data management is certainly not a new problem and is inherent in the nature of war. Commanders must always balance analysis and decision making with time available. New C2 systems and AI have the potential to enable better-informed decisions. We may be on the cusp of moving past “the general unreliability of all information present(ing) a special pro- blem in war: all action takes place…in the twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotes- que and larger than they really are.”6 In the meantime, care must be taken to en- sure these tools serve as a solution for data management, not another contribu- tor to the problem.
Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Bradford currently serves as the Senior Brigade Trainer at the Joint Multinational Readi-
ness Center (JMRC). He previously served as the Commander for Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, V Corps. LTC Bradford’s previous key roles include Brigade Executive Officer (XO) for 316th Cavalry Brigade and 199th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, GA; Battalion XO and S3 for 3-15 Infantry in 2nd Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Division planner in 3rd In- fantry Division. He is a graduate of the Intermediate Level Education at the Com- mand and General Staff College and holds masters of art from the School of Advanced Military Studies and Webster University.
Major Edwin den Harder currently serves as the Brigade Executive Officer Obser- ver, Coach, Trainer (XO OCT) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. His previous key roles include serving as the Brigade Oper- ations Officer Observer, Coach, Trainer (XO OCT) at JMRC, the Brigade S3 for 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and the Battalion S3 for th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, also at Fort Bliss. He is a graduate of the Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College and holds a master of art and a doctorate in History from Ohio State University.
Colonel CJ Kirkpatrick currently serves as the Commander of OperationsGroup, Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels,
Germany.Prior to this assignment, he commanded the 2nd Armored Brigade CombatTeam, 1st Cav- alry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Colonel
Kirkpatrick’s previouskey roles include serving as the J3 for NATO Rapid Deploy- able Corps Türkiye in Istanbul, Türkiye, and as the G3 for 7th Infantry Division at Joint BaseLewis-McChord, Washington. He also commanded th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.
NOTES
1 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander and Staff Guide to Data Literacy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 2025), i.
2 Carl v. Clausewitz, On War, ed. And trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Prince- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 117.
3 LTG Milford Beagle, BG Jason C. Slider, and LTC Matthew R. Arrol, “The Graveyard of Command Posts: What Chornobaivka Should Teach Us about Command and Control in Large -Scale Combat Operations,” Military Review (May-June 2023): 10-2. John F. Antal, 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Ka- rabakh War and the Future of War- fighting (Casemate, 2022).
4 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 6-99, U.S. Army Report and Message Formats (May 2021).
5 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Tactical Display for Soldiers: Human Factors Considerations (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1997)
https://doi.org/10.17226/169.
6 Clausewitz, 10.
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