The TAC spent much of the rotation with- in 4-5 km of the MAIN and only co-locat- ed with the MAIN on two occasions for less than 24 hrs. The TAC had the same communication platforms as the MAIN as well as all necessary mission command and protection systems as the MAIN. Ini- tially, the TAC lacked a robust air picture, but we corrected that in less than 24 hours of beginning force-on-force. Once cor- rected, the Brigade CDR had all mission command capabilities at both the MAIN or TAC.
The decision to separate the MAIN and TAC proved beneficial, as it enabled both command elements to operate with a degree of autonomy while still maintain- ing critical communication links. This sepa- ration created a tactical advantage, as Blackhorse struggled to pinpoint the MAIN’s location due to the constant movement and strategic jumps. The confusion on the part of the OPFOR underscored the effec- tiveness of the 53 IBCT’s approach to mo- bility and operational tempo of jumping the CPs.
The Plans Section remained separate from but near the MAIN. They lacked per- sonnel for security, didn’t have some communication platforms, and life support on their own would have been difficult. As a result, we made the decision to keep them within 500-1,000 m of the MAIN. Thus, the Commander, S3, or XO could quickly sync with the planners on the next oper- ation and validate products to be sent to Battalion Commanders and Staff.
The BISE Section remained in the Rota- tional Unit Bivouac Area or ISB WARRI- OR (RUBA) throughout the entire rotation as if out of the AO, and therefore, protected from OPFOR attacks. They maintained con- nectivity with server stacks that were collocated with them. The BISE never lost connectivity to server, IFS stack, or to DIV level server. The uninterrupted connec- tivity was a result of the extensive use of Starlink for Upper TI and the fact the servers never had to move. They contin- ued to collect intelligence throughout the rotation and continued to send INTSUMs to higher and lower units.
Furthermore, the BISE’s consistent con- nectivity and intelligence-gathering capa- bilities ensured that the unit remained well-informed throughout the rotation.
26
COL Sargeant, 53 IBCT Commander, meets with Battalion Commanders in the Brigade MAIN to synchronize actions for next mission during National Training Center Rotation 25-09, Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo Credit MG Robert Carruthers, Commander Florida Army National Guard)
The uninterrupted flow of intelligence reports allowed for rapid decision-mak- ing and timely responses to emerging threats or changes in the operational environment. This capability was en- hanced by the proximity of the Signal Section, which ensured that all commu- nication systems were fully operational and capable of supporting the various command nodes.
The Signal Section remained in the RUBA next to the BISE. The Signal Staff received generators and ECUs to power and cool server stacks. The Signal Staff built room dividers and duct work to channel cool air to the servers. The team also powered up the servers and connected to the DIV servers almost a week prior to roll-out day. As a result, the Brigade received the tactical OPORD as soon as it dropped on the DIV SharePoint.
The 53rd IBCT sustainment staff esta- blished the ALOC in the Brigade Support Area (BSA). This gave the Brigade S1 and S4 direct access to the BSB SPO for ease of logistics and human resource coordin- ation. It also allowed the S1 to track both real-world and exercise battlefield and non-battlefield injuries. They had direct access to the personnel holding area (P- HA) where notional casualties remained until units submitted casualty feeder pac- kets. The ALOC had most communication
platforms the MAIN, TAC, and BISE had to include SVOIP, JBCP, ATAK, and FM. As a result, the ALOC maintained situa- tional awareness throughout the rotation and anticipated requirements before they became a unit emergency.
Use Terrain to Mask from IDF With each of the command post jumps, the MAIN S2 and S3 Team analyzed the terrain around the next potential location. Some of the factors the team considered were ease of defense from ground, air threats, and impacts to communications.
Careful consideration was put into how to protect the MAIN from indirect fire capa- bilities of Blackhorse. At each of the MAIN locations, staff identified Blackhorse in- direct fire assets to determine the direc- tion and angle of flight for incoming rounds. From that information, the staff identified the best location for terrain to protect the MAIN from indirect fire. On many occas- ions, the only way Blackhorse could gain effects would have been by high-angle mortar fire.
The emphasis on terrain analysis for masking from indirect fire was another critical aspect of the 53 IBCT’s operation- al planning. By leveraging the natural landscape, the staff could effectively shield the MAIN from enemy artillery, forcing Blackhorse to rely on less effec-
CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Spring 2026
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52
