Figure 1. A representation of the Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DKIW) Pyramid. (Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)
the attention of those monitoring the C2 systems. Although generally perceived as a positive development, flattened commun- ications across multiple echelons can dramatically increase the cognitive bur- den on leaders. In the most dramatic exam- ple witnessed at JMRC, one company commander received about 18,000 mes- sages across multiple tactical chat groups over the course of a training rotation. This poses the dilemma where leaders must either read or ignore these messages.
This constant stream of unfiltered and unstructured data leads to cognitive over- load and the loss or lack of recognition of critical information. When a staff mem- ber is sifting through hundreds of chat messages, it is easy to miss a report that answers a priority intelligence require- ment (PIR) or friendly force information requirement (FFIR), validates a key plan- ning assumption, or indicates that the OPFOR is executing a different course of action (COA). When staff officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) must
12
manage a variety of disparate systems, this consumes precious time and mental energy. The lack of integration between mission command systems means that staff often spend an inordinate amount of their time simply trying to get informa- tion from one system to another and onto their COP. This is time they cannot spend conducting analysis, synchronizing the fight, delivering lethal and timely fires, or anticipating the commander’s next deci- sion point.
Trends
At JMRC, the data overload problem is formation-agnostic. In the past 18 months, mobile BCTs (MBCTs), Stryker BCTs (SB- CTs), and armored BCTs (ABCTs) all grap- pled with balancing CP functionality and survivability, doctrinal gaps, training chal- lenges, and technological/systemic issues that contribute to data overload. Equally noteworthy is that in the same period, no two brigades operated with the same primary C2 systems, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans,
and the number and composition of their CPs. This is not a negative situation, as commanders are encouraged to test new concepts and configurations, but sug- gests that doctrine has not caught up with innovation.
Commanders are rightfully concerned with the survivability of their command posts, as large, static, and easily target- able main CPs (MCPs) are a liability on the modern battlefield. This has led to a trend in smaller, more mobile, and more dispersed CP configurations. However, training units often struggle to balance CP functionality versus survivability. While observations from the Nagorno-Karabakh and Russo-Ukrainian wars clearly indi- cate the need for dispersed CPs with low visible and electromagnetic (EM) signa- tures, simply reducing the size of CPs without critical analysis of functionality leads to issues.3 The pressure to reduce size of CPs often leads to the loss of cri- tical capabilities and redundancies as members of the staff and their systems
CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL Spring 2026
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52
