Data Overload: Observations on Data and Mission Command from JMRC


LTC Jordan Bradford MAJ Edwin den Harder COL CJ Kirkpatrick


Data has become a cornerstone of deci- sion making in modern military operations. As the complexity and speed of opera- tions increases, commanders and staff must navigate an ever-growing stream of information to make timely, informed, and effective decisions. The ability to inter- pret, analyze, and apply data has trans- formed from a technical specialty to a critical skill set for leaders at all levels.1


“Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.”2


For military staffs, the challenge of man- aging data is not a new phenomenon, but the scale and complexity of this pro- blem continues to grow. Every techno- logical innovation, from new unmanned aerial system (UAS) platforms to the pro- liferation of digital chat applications down to the team level, creates a new data stream. Flattened information sharing brings in more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, signals intelligence (SIGINT) data and electronic warfare (EW) reports. Each stream brings with it a new requirement for tracking, employment, and communication. Addi- tionally, many of these systems have limited or no interoperability. The result- ing volume of data at the tactical level creates a paradox: instead of clarifying the battlefield, it regularly overwhelms leaders and command posts (CPs), caus- ing them to miss key information. Obser- vations from the Joint Multinational Readi- ness Center (JMRC) indicate that brigade and battalion staff consistently struggle to exercise effective command and con- trol (C2) precisely because of this data overload.


Spring 2026 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL


brigade and battalion commanders and staffs address this challenge.


The Problem: When Data Hinders Rather Than Helps


As a Combat Training Center (CTC), JMRC puts brigade and battalion commanders and staff under the increased cognitive load of simultaneous planning and exe- cuting of operations across multiple time horizons against a thinking, realistic opposing force (OPFOR). Major trends that contribute to data overload in this environment include CPs that struggle to balance survivability and functionality, a lack of data management standard operating procedures/tactics, techniques, and procedures (SOPs/TTPs), a focus on system management at the expense of analysis, and a lack of system interoper- ability. Two additional factors exacerbate the issue of data overload: the reduction in size of brigade and battalion staffs and the movement of the brigade’s Military Intelligence Company (MICO) personnel to the divisional echelon.


The resulting impact on C2 is not “analysis paralysis,” but a failure to recognize cri- tical information in the stream of less crucial data, the loss of precious time to managing a disparate variety of systems, and an unclear common operating pic- ture (COP). Unable to understand, visual- ize, describe, direct, lead, and assess (UVDDLA) as effectively, commanders and staff cannot take advantage of fleeting opportunities or mitigate the risks caused by unexpected enemy actions. This arti- cle not only describes the problem and its contributing factors as observed at JMRC but provides best practices to help


A decade ago, brigade combat teams (BCTs) confronted fewer individual pieces of data, often governed by mission com- mand system capabilities, collection cap- abilities, and data transport network bandwidth. By way of analogy, BCTs used to face the challenge of putting together a 100-piece puzzle of a dog. The quality of the image was not great, but with a rela- tively small number of pieces and limited work putting it together, one could rapidly identify that it was a dog. Today the chal- lenge equates to a highly detailed 10,000 -piece puzzle of that same dog. The pic- ture quality is amazing when the puzzle is finished - but the pieces are tiny and you need thousands of them to recog- nize that the puzzle is a picture of a dog. Additionally, the work required to orga- nize all those tiny pieces is greater.


As opposed to the past, where comman- ders and their staff often struggled with a lack of data, the contemporary challenge is processing, understanding, and acting upon a massive influx of data. Much of the data received at a CTC is seldom converted into a structured or usable form, which increases decision risk and presents an unclear picture for comman- ders (See Figure 1).


A major contributor to this issue is the sheer volume of data received at the tactical level: ISR feeds, SIGINT data, EW reports, and digital chat-based reporting that often extends down to team level generate a tidal wave of data. With mul- tiple units moving, receiving different forms of contact, and taking losses, this situation quickly leads to the generation of dozens of individual digital reports in a short period of time that compete for


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