are dispersed. This, in turn, can result in an inability to execute the six functions of a CP (see Figure 2) during extended periods of high-tempo operations.


The lack of established and rehearsed SOPs and TTPs for digital information management is another leading contri- butor to data overload. Without these pro- ducts or validation of processes through the staff training tables laid out in Training Circular (TC) 6-0.2, Training the Command and Control Warfighting Function for Battalions and Brigades, staff members attempt to establish product formats, reporting procedures, and knowledge management processes during military decision-making process (MDMP) or while in contact. Without prior familiarity and rehearsal, these attempts often induce more confusion than they alle- viate and contribute to further cognitive overload.


Another observed trend is that training prior to JMRC rotations focuses on tech- nical proficiency with systems, not the cognitive skills to analyze and manage the data they produce. Pressed for time during rotations, junior leaders and staff at echelon feel the temptation to pass raw data quickly rather than taking the time to analyze it and provide structured staff estimates or recommendations. This behavior leads to “stovepipes” by war- fighting function as attendees do not provide the necessary inputs to integra- ting processes such as the targeting meeting or operations synchronization meeting (OPSYNCH). It also turns the commander into an action officer, pulling them away from their primary role. The result is a desynchronized fight with as-


sets committed in the wrong location, attritted early, or failing to achieve their desired effects.


Additionally, garrison and home-station training provide insufficient “reps and sets” for staff to operate under conditions of sustained information saturation. A CP exercise (CPX) in garrison might in- volve a handful of simulated reports each hour, not the massive volume of accurate, inaccurate, and partial reports from orga- nic and attached units that characterize the contemporary operating environment. It is not until a CTC rotation that units experience the full cognitive load of sim- ultaneously planning and executing oper- ations across multiple time horizons, meaning units must build systems at home station capable of handling larger than expected volumes of data.


Two years ago, working with multination- al forces posed the only major interop- erability challenges United States units faced. These challenges continue to grow as liaison officers (LNOs) now require more systems to ensure allies and part- ners remain integrated, but the problem is no longer isolated to multinational units. Given the partial fielding of a variety of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), mobile user objective systems (MUOS), and the continued transformation to a modular, extensible, singular and open architec- ture under Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2), United States brigades now encounter interoperability challen- ges with adjacent brigades, aviation task forces, and their higher headquarters. Particularly for non-divisional units and rotational brigades not operating under their organic headquarters, communica-


tion systems interoperability must remain a key discussion. The issue is also exper- ienced internal to a brigade, with direct reporting specialty companies and attach- ments that do not have a battalion head- quarters over them experiencing it most acutely. Secure but unclassified – en- crypted (SBU-E) networking alleviates some of these interoperability problems, but create new operational security (OP- SEC) challenges at the tactical edge for the enemy to exploit.


Systems that are not integrated and do not communicate require “swivel chairs” or black box cross-domain solutions at echelon. While the manual movement of data between C2 systems is certainly not new to anyone who ever took a radio transmission and typed it into their Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP), the amount of data now requiring a “swivel chair” increases the demand on the most precious commodity of radio telephone operators (RTOs), battle captains, staffs, and commanders – their time. It is also a source of human error and often creates duplicate requirements – such as the plot- ting of icons on multiple digital systems. Each system has its own interface, its own login requirements, and its own training requirements. The staff officer becomes a systems integrator by default, a role that they are often not fully trained or equip- ped to perform. Thus, systems fielded to help reduce staff workload are frequently the key contributors to the cognitive over- load experienced in CPs.


None of these problems are new. An alphabet soup of transitions in our past (FBCB2, BFT, JCR, WIN-T, CPOF, CPCE) have created similar data overloaded


Figure 2. Six functions of a Command Post. Spring 2026 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL 13


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52