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tive high-angle fire tactics. This not only protected the command post but also allowed the unit to maintain uninterrupt- ed operational continuity in the face of potential threats.


Maintain Robust Protection Measures including Active and Passive Air Defense


Protection measures at the MAIN and TAC included utilizing decoy Dynamic Radio Emulator System (DRES), easily defend- able locations, and utilizing mounted and dismounted infantry for patrols to hunt and kill Blackhorse special purpose teams near the CP.


We utilized a decoy DRES during the last battle period of the rotation when the 53 IBCT was in the early stages of attack- ing the city of Razish. This system mimics radio signals that would typically emanate from a Battalion CP. The Brigade’s Cavalry Squadron established the system east of the objective to confuse Blackhorse into thinking we would initiate our initial attack from that direction. We attacked from the west. Our deception plan appeared to be effective because Blackhorse iden- tified it and neutralized it not long after we turned it on. Also, the Blackhorse Com- mander admitted they thought we had a Battalion in the vicinity of the DRES pos- tured for an attack.


The MAIN always tried to establish in the next most defendable location that required minimal c-wire. We utilized ve- hicles to block entrances or gaps in the wire or terrain. These combined actions made the CP a difficult target for vehicle mounted adversaries. The only ground contact the MAIN experienced was from


Brigade Combined Arms Rehearsal occurring in a Trench Complex and covered by camouflage netting during National Training Center Rotation 25-09 near Barasu, Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo Credit MG Robert Carruthers, Commander Florida Army National Guard)


a Blackhorse special purpose team the last night of the force-on-force phase. The contact was very limited because the Blackhorse team could not get within 500 meters of the MAIN. We also sent a Spe- cial Forces Team to neutralize the threat.


Every CP in the Brigade utilized camou- flage and passive air defense measures. We covered each vehicle, generator, and all tents with camouflage netting. Addi- tionally, we covered our sand tables with camouflage netting large enough to cover the sand table and the audience and par- ticipants at combined arms rehearsals. We also only used one tent within the footprint of the MAIN instead of multiple tents. Although the PLANS tent was within 500 meters of the MAIN, it wasn’t within the same footprint. As a result, the Brigade MAIN appeared more like a Battalion CP. This prevented Blackhorse from definitely identifying the MAIN as a CP much less the Brigade CP.


The MAIN and TAC had active air defense measures, both avengers and shoulder mounted stingers, to defend against red air. We used the week prior to roll-out to the Box to train multiple Soldiers on the use and targeting with stingers, which were obtained from NTC once we ar- rived. This investment proved beneficial. The MAIN experienced a red air attack on one occasion, and we neutralized the attack with a stinger. This result was common among Battalion CPs as well.


Finally, the robust protection measures implemented by the MAIN, including the deployment of infantry for patrols and the use of both active and passive air defense systems, created a formidable defensive posture. The combination of ground patrols to detect and neutralize threats before they could reach the MAIN, along with the use of stingers for air de- fense, provided a layered security ap- proach that further complicated Black- horse’s attempts to disrupt our C2 nodes.


Conclusion


Brigade MAIN Command Post during National Training Center Rotation 25-09 near Whale Gap, Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo Credit MG Robert Carruthers, Commander Florida Army National Guard)


Spring 2026 CAVALRY & ARMOR JOURNAL


In conclusion, the strategies employed by the 53 IBCT during NTC Rotation 25- 09 highlight the importance of adaptabil- ity, communication, thorough planning, and CP battle drills. The lessons learned from this exercise will not only inform future rotations but also contribute to the overall readiness and effectiveness of the unit in real-world scenarios. The combination of effective mobility, separ- ation of command elements, robust com- munication, terrain utilization, and com- prehensive protection measures has set a benchmark for future operations.


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