Security Concerns Outside the Brick & Mortar

By Mark Camillo

Securing public assembly venues is not a new concept. Tailoring security to events within venues is becoming the norm in operational security planning, resting upon baseline security measures in place. We are moving in the right direction in order to stay ahead of the ever-changing threat. Credit in many cases goes to sports leagues and professional organizations that recommend or even require best prac-  training programs such as the Academy for Venue Safety & Security, and provide basic and advanced coursework tailored for venue man- agement professionals. Public sector organizations such as the Depart-   - land security and emergency preparedness, have become resource centers for critical information to enhance venue resilience. They have also established an array of either no-cost or low-cost training avail- able either online or in classroom settings. The mantra “Prepare, Prevent, Respond & Recover,” often associ-

ated with the Department of Homeland Security, opened the aperture of venue security to include preparedness and preventative measures in the overall plan. Prior to the attacks on 09/11, it was unlikely to see  Any screening conducted was likely for prohibited items in the form   at the gates more than potential malicious acts committed once inside. The exception was events secured by agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service for dignitaries and events designated as a National Special Se- curity Events, which came into existence in 1998. Law enforcement assigned to venues is not new. Agencies have

always been keen to potential illicit drug activity at certain types of events and have a long history of responding to disorderly fans of-  emergency medical services have a long history of dedicating person- nel and resources to event sites. Today, however, we cannot predict the manner in which we will be

attacked, or by whom. The days of exclusively tracking foreign terror- ist organizations (FTOs) in order to predict likely commercial facility targets is behind us. Although FTOs continue to be a persistent threat, social media has now spawned a new threat actor known as a Home- grown Violent Extremist, or a HVE. These are individuals who have elected to commit a malicious act after being inspired from sources via the Internet. They also have access to media reports on terrorist acts previously committed by others, regardless of their proclaimed cause. This copycat mentality is, and will continue to be, a concern for

those of us who have the responsibility to create and maintain a safe and secure environment at venues. Additionally, the lone wolf that we

12 Facility Manager Magazine

fear will target our venues may be driven to committing destructive acts due to mental illness. These attacks, as we have sadly witnessed in recent history, have been committed by individuals who planned and executed their deadly attacks with no apparent association or alle- giance to hate or extremist groups. Event types or event themes also stimulate negative interest. For the

venue manager, the schedule of events is often decided by someone else. With more and more venues becoming multi-use in their design, threat considerations can no longer be limited to one particular event or attraction. Many of our venues today host a wide variety of events in one week. Each one of these events, whether they be sporting, en- tertainment, celebratory, or faith-based, may bring along with it a dif- ferent host of threats or at minimum negative interest. Sadly, in recent years we have witnessed a spike in activity outside

our venues that suggest those with negative intent are choosing to commit acts of disruption and even destruction without the objective of gaining access into the venue. It is imperative that venue manage- ment teams expand their area of concern to include areas outside the classic hardened perimeter.

Exterior Concerns •  The density of the crowd assembling to enter a security checkpoint can be an inviting target for attack. A threat actor can weave his way into the crowd and achieve objectives using  even edged weapons.

Countermeasure Considerations  - trances on event day to look for inappropriate or pre-attack behavior.   this capability, but check before adding this coverage. • Coordinate with your local law enforcement agency to determine if  behavior. • Work with both your local law enforcement agency and recommend- ed private security companies to have specially trained K-9 teams that can detect vapors emitted by individuals carrying or wearing explosive devices.

 Patrons exiting after an event naturally move in mass, thereby creating another crowd density situation. A threat -

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