SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

THE IMPACT OF THE

IN SPANISH COURT TWO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. LISA CARLSON ON ILLINOIS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS

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llinois community associations heaved a collective sigh of relief last March when the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its decision in Spanish Court Two Condominium Association v. Lisa Carlson, a ruling that underscored the critical role of both assessments and the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act to the viability of residential associations. The victory was a narrow one: 4-3, with Justice Theis writing the majority decision. What does this Opinion mean for residential community associations in the State of Illinois, and how might the landscape of association living in Illinois have changed if the decision had been 4-3 in the opposite direction?

Background into the Spanish Court Two decision

Understanding the ramifications of Spanish Court requires a familiarity with the procedural and substantive underpinnings of the case: Lisa Carlson is the owner of a unit in a condominium association in Highland Park, Illinois: Spanish Court Two. She had stopped paying her assessments, claiming she was justified in so doing because of water infiltration into her condominium unit. The association sued Carlson pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (the “Forcible Act”) due to her unpaid assessments. Carlson both answered the Forcible complaint, and filed affirmative defenses and a counterclaim in response, alleging that she was justified in stopping payment of her assessments based on the association’s purported breach of its duties under the condominium declaration.

Because the Forcible Act prohibits the introduction into a Forcible lawsuit of “matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the [Forcible] proceeding,” the association filed motions to strike the affirmative defenses and to sever the counterclaim, both of which motions the trial court judge granted. Carlson was thereby allowed to pursue her claim that the association had breached duties to her in a non-Forcible proceeding before another Judge. Among other things, Carlson appealed the trial court’s ruling on those two motions, claiming that her affirmative defenses and counterclaim were germane to the Forcible proceeding and should have been allowed to proceed in the Forcible lawsuit. The Second District Appellate Court agreed in part, reversing the trial court’s striking of the affirmative defenses, but affirming that part of the ruling that severed the counterclaim.

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