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GEOLOGIC NOTES ON FORT PLACEMENT


firing positions, giving the artillery and rifled muskets open and deadly angles.


Figure 9 shows an idealized breast-


works of the type shown on the map in Figure 2.


Camp Nelson also had satellite for-


tifications (to enfilade the Hickman bridge; one example is shown in Figure 10). Of the two turnpike bridges that crossed the Kentucky River at that time, Hickman Bridge was a double-width covered bridge. It survived the civil war intact.


If necessary, the cavalry could pres-


sure Confederate raiders overland or be delivered by rail. It is the characteristic of cavalry to show up at places and times unlooked for and, in an age predat- ing barbed wire, speeding and stealthy cavalry sought out enemy position and strength information. Cavalry duties included finding informants and guides. Cavalry were “shock troops” or the elite soldiers on the field. They were expected to pioneer the trails for the army to follow and to engage the enemy as a rear guard if necessity called for retreat. They were a challenger for enemy cavalry.


Decidedly, a fortification at Camp


Nelson was needed. An engineer speci- fied the type of structure that would best achieve the vision of the commander. The last decisions, once under fire, lay with the “earthwork superintendent,” applying field expedient measures to shore up the defenses (Nichol, 1996).


An artist, engineer or other officer


using cartographic skills likely prepared maps showing the location to be defended or the topography that influenced the placement and design of the fort along with the range of the major artillery on any bastions or hilltops (Dunnigan, 2012). Obstacles or rifle pits would be constructed to deny the enemy favorable locations nearby. It was rebel General


Figure 9 - Cross section of idealized 19th Century fort.


Morgan’s habit to pack along the small mountain howitzer, therefore the plan- ner in Kentucky had to think about the possible appearance of artillery.


Why Target Saltville? Salt made war possible. Among other


uses, salt was necessary for preservation of food, leather manufacture, and for human and animal consumption. Salt’s essential nature has been recognized since prehistory (Whisonant, 2015).


The Confederate army mined iron,


lead and salt in Southwestern Virginia. Major Union actions against Saltville and nearby Wythe County are reported in two thorough Virginia Mines and Mineral publications by Whisonant (Whisonant, 1996). The strategic value of Saltville was that it served to preserve the pork needed to feed the southern sol- diers and its rail line connected Knoxville on the west side of the Appalachians to Virginia.


The Union’s appraisal of Saltville’s


target value were likely as follows; 1). Meat preservation, 2) lead production, 3) salt, 4) communication by rail, 5) iron works, and 6) diversion of slave labor to free. The selection of Saltville in October as a target seems logical. In addi- tion, Burbridge observed the the- atre situation had changed. June 12, 1864, Burbridge defeated Morgan at


Cynthiana,


KY; September 4, 1864, Union General Gillam struck Greenville TN, and killed General Morgan, whose Kentucky rebels


protecting approach


Figure 10 - Redoubt (inside 900ft contour) overlooking bridge (immediately E of modern bridge.


Sight line indicated by thin dashed line. After KGS, 2019. www.aipg.org


Southwestern Virginia. With Morgan gone, less vigilance perhaps


was required back home (Prichard, 2014) and the Federals would have good for- tune.


The Timeline Kentucky abandoned its “neutral-


ity” position in August of 1861 and was promptly invaded. In September, Confederate General Felix Zollicoffer raided the Kentucky salt works at Clay County, hauling away 600 bushels of the substance. Out of military neces- sity, Union forces destroyed the salt operations in late October 1862.


Clay


County, Kentucky rated among the top five salt manufactories open to the South (Whisonant, 1996). The Kentucky salt works changed possession four times in the course of the war in contrast to the salt operation in Southwest Virginia, which remained untouched by the Union until after Gettysburg.


The Southwest Virginia salt works


was associated with folded sabkha deposits of the Mississippian MacCrady Formation. (See cross section Figure 11) At its peak in 1864, the salt project included 38 furnaces, 2,600 kettles and perhaps as many as 300 buildings. The huge salt output during the war years commonly exceeded the railroad’s ability to transport it, and reached an estimated two-thirds of all the salt required by the Confederacy.


were the to


Burbridge submitted plans for his campaign on Saltville to Washington and at acceptance, his attack involved several white regiments as well as the 5th and part of the 6th USCC. The path conformed to the valley of the Big Sandy River reaching into Virginia, extending 300 miles with the final 40 miles in Virginia. A horse soldier is expected to travel 35 miles per day and Commanders must keep the column tight and in con- tact in mountains. Eight men lost their lives to falls during the arduous passage. (Whisonant, 1996).


On October 2, 1864, Burbridge’s


units struck Saltville. The rebel militia dug into the high ground and delayed


Jul.Aug.Sep 2019 • TPG 59


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