passed on to others are distributed among larger groups of people. At the same time, reductions in risk, or the perception of risk, potentially infl uence behavior. It is unlikely that tort reform markedly degrades or improves quality of care, but some evidence does suggest that certain providers make diff erent decisions about patient care in the wake of reforms.7,8


Georgia’s Recent Tort Reform History Georgia last attempted to enact tort reform in 2005. At the time, premiums were increasing, and payout amounts as a percentage of premium revenue were high.11


Just 5 years


procedural reforms include limits on the use of arguments intended to “anchor” noneconomic damages to arbitrary values, allowing trial bifurcation, and limiting special damages for healthcare expenses to the “reasonable value of medically necessary care.” Trial bifurcation is a process by which a trial is split into two phases: a determination of fault and a determination of compensatory damages. If the fi rst phase fi nds no fault, then the second phase is unnecessary. SB 69 regulates litigation fi nancing,


T e bill included provisions capping


noneconomic damages related to health care at $350,000, allowing for periodic payment of damages over time, and several other technical changes.11


later, Georgia’s Supreme Court issued a ruling that declared the damages cap unconstitutional.11 wrote:


Chief Justice Hunstein


Noneconomic damages caps…violate the constitutional right to trial by jury…we conclude that at the time of the adoption of our Constitution of 1798, there did exist the common law right to a jury trial…with an attendant right to the award of the full measure of damages… as determined by the jury.12


T is declaration removed a major component of Georgia’s 2005 legislation. T e specifi cs of Georgia’s most recent tort reform package are informed by this decision, and many of the new provisions seek to limit costs while working within constitutional bounds.


SB 68 and SB 69 Georgia’s legislature passed two bills related to tort reform in the 2025 legislative session. T e fi rst bill, SB 68, made a series of procedural reforms. T e second bill, SB 69, aims to regulate litigation fi nancing practices. One bill aims to control costs. T e other bill aims to limit outside infl uence on litigation. For dentists, much of the meat of


Georgia’s tort reform package lies in SB 68’s series of procedural reforms. Key


the practice of third parties investing in a lawsuit in exchange for a share of the profi t. T e practice of litigation fi nancing was historically prohibited by law; however, New South Wales in Australia rolled back its laws in 1993 to allow outside interests to help fund expensive class actions.13 Eventually, England and the United States followed suit.13


SB 69 includes provisions


that require fi nanciers to register with the state, and it sets guardrails in place that limit what a fi nancier can and cannot do.


What Georgia Dentists Can Expect T e potential impact of tort reform on Georgia dentists is uncertain. In general, sustained reforms that reduce cost, with the best evidence specifi cally assessing caps on non-economic damages, appear to reduce or otherwise temper rising malpractice premiums.6


One caveat is


that this tempering can take time, and other market factors also play a role.6


7 Even


so, this is good news for dentists during a period when over 45% of providers cite increasing overhead costs as a top challenge going into 2025.14 Given that caps on non-economic


damages have been deemed unconstitutional in Georgia, the latest tort reform package seeks to address runaway costs and expensive verdicts through other means. T e degree to which these reforms will have an impact is an open question. While it does not cap damages, SB 68 introduces constraints that would have a similar eff ect to a cap. Reining in payouts that include “phantom” damages, awards that include the diff erence between what providers billed and what they were


8 9 1 2 3


tort. Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. June 2024. Accessed July 9, 2025. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort


Dental Malpractice Law. Justia. July 2025. Accessed July 9, 2025. https://www. justia.com/injury/medical-malpractice/dental-malpractice/


Vidmar N. Juries and Medical Malpractice Claims: Empirical Facts versus Myths. Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2009;467(2):367-375. doi:10.1007/s11999-008- 0608-6


4


Purdue J. Tort reform and Georgia’s judicial nightmare. Georgia Public Policy Foundation. https://www.georgiapolicy.org/news/tort-reform-and-georgias- judicial-nightmare/. June 13, 2024. Accessed November 7, 2024.


5 6


Groves C. What is tort reform? And why the AJC doesn’t call it that. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. January 30, 2025.


Viscusi WK. Medical Malpractice Reform: What Works and What Doesn’t. Denver Law Review. 2019;96(2):775-791. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr/ vol96/iss4/2


Agarwal R, Gupta A, Gupta S. The impact of tort reform on defensive medicine, quality of care, and physician supply: A systematic review. Health Serv Res. 2019;54(4):851-859. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.13157


Conrad DA, Milgrom P, Whitney C, O’Hara D, Fiset L. The Incentive Eff ects of Malpractice Liability Rules on Dental Practice Behavior. Med Care. 1998;36(5): 706-719. doi:10.1097/00005650-199805000-00010


Born PH, Karl JB, Viscusi WK. The net eff ects of medical malpractice tort reform on health insurance losses: the Texas experience. Health Econ Rev. 2017;7(1). doi:10.1186/s13561-017-0174-2


10 11


Grace MF, Leverty JT. How Tort Reform Aff ects Insurance Markets. J Law Econ Organ. 2013;29(6):1253-1278. doi:10.1093/jleo/ews026


Tucker C, McNamara K, Graves C, Caldwell C, Dever G. Medical Liability & Tort Reform in Georgia.; 2011. Accessed July 13, 2025. https://healthcareworkforce. georgia.gov/document/publication/medical-liability-tort-reform-georgia- january-2011/download


12


Hunstein C. ATLANTA OCULOPLASTIC SURGERY, P. C. , d/b/a OCULUS v. NESTLEHUTT et Al.(2010). Accessed July 13, 2025. https://law.justia.com/cases/ georgia/supreme-court/2010/s09a1432.html


13


How Litigation Finance Works. Bloomberg Law. February 24, 2020. Accessed July 15, 2025. https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/insights/litigation/how-litigation- fi nance-works/


14


Economic Outlook and Emerging Issues in Dentistry Insights from Data from Q4 2024 Plus: A Look Ahead into 2025.; 2025. Accessed July 15, 2025. https://www. ada.org/-/media/project/ada-organization/ada/ada-org/fi les/resources/research/ hpi/dec2024_hpi_economic_outlook_dentistry_slides.pdf


actually paid, is a helpful fi rst step. So is avoiding unnecessary trial proceedings and preventing arbitrarily high anchor amounts from swaying the jury’s decision-making. At the end of the day, only time will tell.


Complex dynamics determine the fi nal eff ect of reforms like this, and it could take years to feel the full eff ect. GDA will continue to advocate for commonsense policies that support Georgia dentists and protect their patients’ oral health.


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Sept 2025


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