This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
PROTECTING PUBLIC VENUES


FROM TERRORISTS ATTACKS By Mark Lang


In the aftermath of the suicidal bombing at the Manchester Arena  asking the hard questions that undoubtedly come after such an attack. What if this occurred at my venue? A terroristic attack has always been a possibility at any U.S. venue, albeit low by some accounts in the industry. What conclusions can be drawn to this attack overseas? Any illusions this is only contained in Europe would be foolish. What happens overseas most likely will occur here in the United States on some scale even with the best law enforcement agencies’ attempts to thwart such attacks. Training and preparedness for the varied threats that terrorists can bring to a public venue are keys to avoidance and response to such attacks. Safety and security are the expectations of any guests attending events at public venues. Conventional soft  in the United States. The article below was written two years ago, yet is relevant and current to what industry standards should strive for with the utilization of local SWAT Teams. The cost of security will continue to rise from the terrorist attack in the U.K. and will sky- rocket when it occurs in the States. The terroristic economy of such  well-being even at home. It is the intention of the following article to promote new ideas to exceed the current terroristic challenges that lie ahead. Increased security will be expected by guests to maintain public venue safety. In March 2008, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security issued an assessment asserting that stadiums and arenas are potential targets during events. Further, it was stated, “it’s just a matter of time before terrorists target a major sports event.” Open-air venues where fans gather to watch sporting events or concerts are extremely vulnerable to attack. In January 2009, DHS issued an assessment report titled “Threats to College Sports and Entertainment Venues and Surrounding Ar- eas.” This report expounded on public transportation and infrastruc- ture as a target of attack if the venue is perceived as being secured.


Past Attempts On Oct. 1, 2005, Joel Hinrichs detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) on a bench 200 yards away from the University of Oklahoma football stadium, where nearly 85,000 people were in at- tendance. The FBI concluded that it was an accidental suicide, but the agency could not prove or disprove that Hinrichs intended to enter the stadium and detonate his IED. In Tampa, Florida, in 2008, a male named Kurt Havelock mailed a manifesto to local media outlets stating he would “shed the blood of the innocent” and threatened to shoot people at the upcoming  -


30 Facility Manager Magazine 30 Facility Manager Magazine


munition, he changed his mind at the stadium and turned himself in to the police. (His conviction on mailing threats was later overturned on appeal.) These and other incidents underscore the very real threat to those who attend sporting or non-sporting events in large venues. Many in law enforcement may be unaware of just how attractive a target and how lax the security is. Where do we start the process of hardening our public venues? Our friends and family attend a variety of events at large venues, and the expectation is one of security and safety. However, as we look at what assets are present at the venue, are they enough to combat terrorism and prevent it from happening? This article examines the current response and potential threats, and focuses on what police snipers and SWAT can add to prevent tragedy at a sporting event.


Soft Target or Hard Target Public sporting venues are generally considered to be soft targets,   - cers and private security handle traditional disturbances and traf-      time you attended a sporting event at your local venue, what did   to soft security? How easy would it be to compromise the security of the event, even with the use of manometers and handheld devices? What is the level of training for those using those devices? Is there an immediate action plan that has been trained if there is a directed     run toward it, creating a prime location for an ambush while other terrorists lie in wait to kill patrons running out of the exits?


Threat Environment at Public Venues Threats at public venues could be international or domestic terror- ism, a threat from a lone wolf or one from an insider. The method of attack could be an active shooter, a vehicle- or person-borne IED, an air attack or a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agent. Active shooters. This threat could cause multiple victims and have


 - tive shooter incidents have taken place in all areas of our country       present level of security in venues is adequate could prove tragic. Also of concern is the lack of standardized active shooter training - umbine, many police departments realized that they had to train for active shooters in an unconventional way. Push to contact and stop


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68